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TARSKI’S RELEVANCE LOGIC; VERSION 2
ROGER D. MADDUX
Abstract. Tarski’s relevance logic is defined and shown to contain many for-
mulas and derived rules of inference. The definition arises from Tarski’s work
on first-order logic restricted to finitely many variables. It is a relevance logic
because it contains the Basic Logic of Routley-Plumwood-Meyer-Brady, has
Belnap’s variable-sharing property, and avoids the paradoxes of implication.
It does not include several formulas used as axioms in the Anderson-Belnap
system R. For example, the Axiom of Contraposition is not in Tarski’s rele-
vance logic. On the other hand, the Rules of Contraposition and Disjunctive
Syllogism are derived rules of inference in Tarski’s relevance logic. It also
contains a formula (not previously known or considered as an axiom for any
relevance logic) that provides a counterexample to a completeness theorem of
T. Kowalski (that the system R is complete with respect to the class of dense
commutative relation algebras).
1. Introduction
In 1975, Alfred Tarski delivered a pair of lectures on relation algeras at the
University of Campinas. The lectures were videotaped and transcriptions of them
appeared in the book Alfred Tarski: Lectures at UniCamp in 1975 published
in 2016. At the end of his second lecture, Tarski said (p. 154),
“And finally, the last question, if it is so, you could ask me a ques-
tion whether this definition of relation algebra which I have sug-
gested and which I have founded — I suggested it many years ago
— is justified in any intrinsic sense. If we know that these are not
all equations which are needed to obtain representation theorems,
this means, to obtain the algebraic expression of first-order logic
with two-place predicate, if we know that this is not an adequate
expression of this logic, then why restrict oneself to these equa-
tions? Why not to add strictly some other equations which hold in
representable relation algebras or maybe all?”
Tarski’s question arises from the fact that the equations he chose for his axiom-
atization of relation algebras are all simple and natural and occur throughout
the nineteenth century literature on the algebra of logic, such as the works of
Peirce [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] and Schro¨der [51, 52, 53, 54, 55] and
yet the choice is clearly arbitrary. Furthermore, the axioms were shown to be in-
complete, hence insufficient for proving representability, by Lyndon [23] in 1950.
Back in 1941 Tarski [56, pp. 87–88] wrote,
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“Is it the case that every sentence of the calculus of relations which
is true in every domain of individuals is derivable from the axioms
adopted under the second method? This problem presents some
difficulties and remains open. I can only say that I am practically
sure that I can prove with the help of the second method all of the
hundreds of theorems to be found in Schroder’s Algebra und Logik
der Relative.”
The “second method” is Tarski’s equational axiomatization. The problem Tarski
posed was to find a true equation that his axioms can’t prove. Lyndon solved
Tarski’s open problem in his 1950 paper by showing the answer is “no”. This left
only Tarski’s rather practical reason for adopting his axioms: they are good enough
to prove a lot.
Besides what could be proved from his axioms, Tarski was also concerned from
the outset with what could be expressed with equations. This topic had been
considered already by Schro¨der and Lo¨wenheim [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. By
the early 1940s Tarski had proved that the equations of relation algebras have the
same expressive power as first-order logic restricted to three variables. Tarski took
a first-order language with an equality symbol and other binary relation symbols
(but no function symbols or constants), reduced the usual stock of countably many
variables to just three, added a binary operator | on relation symbols, and included a
definition asserting that the operator produces the relative product of the relations
denoted by the inputs:
(1) (A|B)(x, y) ↔ ∃z(A(x, z) ∧B(z, y)).
He included other operators on relation symbols, for union, complementation, and
converse, along with their definitions
(A ∪B)(x, y) ↔ A(x, y) ∨B(x, y),(2)
A(x, y) ↔ ¬A(x, y),(3)
A−1(x, y) ↔ A(y, x).(4)
Finally, Tarski introduced a new form of sentence called an equation, written A =
B, made out of two relation symbols A and B and a new equality symbol, with this
definition
A = B ↔ ∀x∀y(A(x, y) ↔ B(x, y)).
In Tarski’s definition for |, z is the first variable distinct from x and y. Such a
variable always exists because Tarski’s language has three variables. To illustrate,
the associative law for relative multiplication is
(A|B)|C = A|(B|C),
and its expansion according to the definition of | is
∀x∀y
(
∃z
(
∃y(A(x, y) ∧B(y, z)) ∧C(z, y)
)
↔ ∃z
(
A(x, z) ∧ ∃x(B(z, x) ∧C(x, y))
))
.
The burden of parentheses can be reduced by resorting to subscripts.
∀x∀y
(
∃z
(
∃y(Ax,y ∧By,z) ∧ Cz,y
)
↔ ∃z
(
Ax,z ∧ ∃x(Bz,x ∧ Cx,y)
))
.
Tarski observed that every relation-algebraic equation expands to a formula in first-
order logic of binary relations restricted to three variables, as was just done for the
associative law, and then he proved that every formula is equivalent to such an
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expansion, i.e., every formula of 3-variable first-order logic (of binary relations)
can be converted to an equivalent relation-algebraic equation. For details, consult
[28, 59].
Naturally, Tarski included the associative law as an axiom for relation algebras.
With regard to the other axioms, Tarski found that he could not only express them
with three variables, but also prove them with only three variables. On the other
hand, Tarski’s proof of the associative law used four variables. Could it be proved
with only three variables? J. C. C. McKinsey had invented an algebra that satisfies
all of Tarski’s axioms for relation algebras except the associative law, thus proving
that the associative law is independent of the other axioms. Tarski used McKinsey’s
algebra to prove that the associative law for relative multiplication cannot be proved
in first-order logic with only three variables.
This is how things stood in 1975, when Tarski asked, “whether this definition
of relation algebra ... is justified in any intrinsic sense”. Tarski had proved that
every equation true in all relation algebras, i.e., every equation that follows from
his axioms by the rules of equational logic (equality is transitive and symmetric,
and equals may be substituted for equals) can be proved in first-order logic with
four variables. Since the associative law is the only axiom requiring four variables
to prove, Tarski asked whether deleting it would result in an equational theory
equivalent to 3-variable logic in means of proof as well as expression. If not, could
the associative be replaced with a weaker version to yield an equational theory
equivalent to 3-variable logic?
These problems were included in the draft of the Tarski-Givant book [59], which
was being written at the time of Tarski’s talk. This book started life as an unpub-
lished manuscript by Tarski from the early 1940s. Work on the revision was begun
in 1971. It was planned to become Tarski’s contribution to the Proceedings of the
Tarski Symposium [6, 9], held in honor of his 70th birthday, but grew into a project
not published until four years after his death.
Around this time of Tarski’s talk it was proved that the answers are “no” and
“yes”, i.e., deleting the associative law leaves an axiom set that is too weak, but a
weakened associative law, dubbed the “semi-associative law” can replace the asso-
ciative law to produce an equational theory that is a precise correlate of first-order
logic of binary relation symbols and only three individual variables—every sen-
tence of 3-variable logic is equivalent to an equation, and every provable sentence
of 3-variable logic is equivalent to an equation provable from the weakened axiom
set. (Algebras satisfying this weakened axiom set are now called semi-associative
relation algebras, but their initial name was “Tarski algebras”.) Furthermore, the
equations true in all relation algebras are exactly those that are equivalent to a
statement in 3-variable logic of binary relations and can be proved with four vari-
ables. For details see [25, 26, 28, 59].
This last result provides a potential answer to Tarski’s question, “whether this
definition of relation algebra ... is justified in any intrinsic sense”. The justification
of Tarski’s axioms would be that their consequences are the equations that are
• equivalent to statements in first-order logic of binary relations, restricted
to three variables, and
• are provable with four variables.
Certainly one can dispute whether this characterization is “intrinsic”, but any true
equation not provable with four variables must require at least five, and finding
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such formulas is difficult. The shortest ones known are quite complicated. It is a
safe bet that no such formula was ever encountered for any other purpose prior to
Lyndon’s proof that Tarski’s axioms are incomplete.
Tarski never published his proof that the associative law requires four variables
to prove; see [10, p. 65]. Henkin [8] published such a proof, but for cylindric algebras
rather than relation algebras. The connections between these two subjects had been
studied from the early 1960s by Monk [36, 37].
A search for Henkin [8] led to the same volume containing Routley-Meyer [49].
What Routley and Meyer define as a “relevant model structure” in that paper was
immediately recognized as nearly the same as the atom structure of an integral
relation relation, but with one property missing and two more added. The atom
structures of relation algebras with the two additional properties (density and com-
mutativity) form particularly nice relevant model structures. They have two other
additional properties, one called “normal” by Routley and Meyer, the other called
“tagging” by Dunn; for more details, see [30, §7].
Indeed, making use of the database of finite relation algebras compiled for [28],
one can see that out of 4527 integral relation algebras with five or fewer atoms, all
of them are “normal”, all of them have “tagging”, 3885 of them are commutative
(satisfy x;y = y ;x), 822 of them are dense (satisfy x ≤ x;x), and 626 are both
commutative and dense. Many of these 626 relevant model structures are the atom
structures of proper relation algebras. The elements of proper relation algebras are
binary relations, and their operations are the usual set-theoretic operations on re-
lations: union, intersection, complementation (with respect to the largest relation),
relative multiplication (or composition), and conversion (forming the converse of
a binary relation). This allows Routley-Meyer semantics to be deciphered into
ordinary mathematical concepts in common use.
Routley and Meyer refer to the objects in a relevant model structure at first
as “worlds”, but settle on “set-ups” (which might be, as they suggest, “sets of
beliefs”). Other words have been employed on these objects, such as “situations”
or “points”. However, in relevant model structures arising from proper relation
algebras, the set-ups (or worlds, or situations, or points) are clearly identified; they
are simply binary relations.
The logical connectives considered by Routley and Meyer are conjunction ∧,
disjunction ∨, negation ∼, and implication → [49, p. 204, §1]. Every valuation
v determines a map that sends each propositional variable and set-up to a truth
value, either T or F [49, p. 206, §3]. A valuation extends to an interpretation I
defined for all formulas and set-ups. An interpretation in turn determines a map,
we call it J , from formulas to sets of set-ups. Conditions ii and iii [49, p. 206]
defining the extension show how the connectives are interpreted: conjunction as
intersection and disjunction as union. The treatment of negation involves (what
has become known as) the Routley star. The Routley star in a relevant model
structure matches up with the unary operation of forming the converse of the atom
in the atom structure of a relation algebra. In a proper relation algebra, this is
simply the ordinary converse of a binary relation—the result of turning all the
pairs around. Condition vi [49, p. 206] shows that negation is to be treated as the
converse of the complement (or, what is the same thing, the complement of the
converse). We call this simply converse-complementation. Condition v [49, p. 206]
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shows that the binary connective ◦, defined by
(D1) A ◦B = ∼(A→ ∼B)
in [49, p. 204] (later called “fusion”), is interpreted as relative multiplication in the
opposite order, that is,
(5) A ◦B = B|A.
This is a good place to notice a notational coincidence. In the case where A and
B are unary functions, (5) shows that ◦ denotes the usual operation of composing
these two functions. The use of ◦ for functional composition is common in a wide
range of mathematical literature, including calculus textbooks. Instead of writing
〈x, y〉 ∈ A in case A is a function, it is customary to write A(x) = y, since there is
no other ordered pair in A whose first component is x, i.e., y is uniquely determined
by A and x. Composing A and B produces a function denoted A ◦B, defined by
(A ◦B)(x) = A(B(x)).
This is an abbreviated way of describing the relative product of A and B in the
opposite order. It says, in more detail, that 〈x,B(x)〉 ∈ B and 〈B(x), A(B(x))〉 ∈
A. Combining these two statements according to (1) yields 〈x,A(B(x))〉 ∈ B|A,
establishing (5) in case A and B are functions. The notational coincidence is that
the same symbol was (inadvertantly, as it turns out) chosen for the same thing.
A discussion of definition (D1), incorporating remarks of Anderson, Nelnap,
Dunn, Woodruff, and Meyer, occurs in [2, §27.1.4], where the “memorable and
delightful” properties of ◦ are mentioned, including associativity (see Lemma 38
below). However, they ask [2, p. 345],
“3. How then to interpret ◦? We confess puzzlement.
In some ways ◦ looks like conjunction . . .
But ◦ fails to have the property A ◦B → A; so it isn’t conjunc-
tion.”
Perhaps the proper interpretation of ◦ is identified in (5). In this context Meyer’s
remarks seem remarkably insightful:
“The term ’fusion’ is, I believe, due to Fine, and it is a good one;
previous tries were ’intensional conjunction’, ’relevant conjunction’,
’consistency’, and ’cotenability’. But the first two invite confusion
with the extensional conjunction ’&’, while the latter two depend
on properties of the negation-of R that have not, so far, generalized
to related logics. The notion, in one guise or another, has been in-
vented or re-invented by Lewis, Nelson, Anderson-Belnap, Church,
Dunn, Curry, Meredith, Powers, Routley, Urquhart, Fine and the
author, no doubt among several score others. It is to be attributed
accordingly to Tarski, on the ground that, when it comes to uni-
fying principles, no one is likely to have anticipated him. Except,
maybe, Peirce.” [32, Note 4, p. 85]
Condition iv [49, p. 206] shows that implication should be interpreted as resid-
uation, defined as an operation on binary relations by (3), (4), and
(6) A→ B = A−1|B,
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or, in expanded form
(7) (A→ B)(x, y) ↔ ∀z(A(z, x)→ B(z, y)).
A good example of residuation is the subset relation between sets—it is the resid-
ual of the membership relation with itself. Formulas of relevance logic may be
interpreted as subsets of a relevant model structure, i.e., as sets of atoms in the
atom structure of a relation algebra, i.e., as elements of an atomic relation algebra
(since the elements are joins of sets of atoms), or, and this is the most important
case, as binary relations in a proper relation algebra. This includes an interpreta-
tion each connective in any relation algebra, and in proper relation algebras those
interpretations are disjunction as union, conjunction as intersection, negation as
converse-complementation, and implication as residuation.
What remains is to figure out, from the Routley-Meyer definition of verification
in a relevant model structure, how a formula is verified in a proper relation algebra.
Routley and Meyer explain,
“The real world plays a distinguished role in our semantical postu-
lates. (Accordingly we call it 0 rather than G; not only does the
former look better [this is supposed to be, remember, a mathemat-
ical semantics] , but it correctly hints that 0 will play the formal
role of an identity.) It’s necessary to distinguish 0 for the following
reason: Logical truth does not turn out to be truth in all set-ups;
for the strategy which dispatches the paradoxes lies in allowing
even logical identities to turn out sometimes false. (What, after
all, could be better grounds for denying that q entails p → p than
to admit that sometimes q is true when, essentially on grounds of
relevance, p→ p isn’t?)
“What then is logical truth? Truth in all set-ups, of course, in
which all the logical truths are true!” [49, p. 202]
“Truth at 0 is as noted earlier what counts in verifying logical
truths; accordingly we say simply that A is verified on v, or on
the associated I, just in case I(A, 0) = T , and otherwise that A is
falsified on v.” [49, p. 207]
In other words, if the map determined by an interpretation sends a formula A to
a set of set-ups that includes 0, then that formula is verified. The distinguished
element in the atom structure of an integral relation algebra is the identity element.
Integral relation algebras are exactly the ones in which the identity element is an
atom. The identity element matches up with the distinguished 0 of a relevant model
structure. In a proper relation algebra, the identity element is the identity relation
on the underlying set whose pairs make up the binary relations belonging to the
proper relation algebra.
Assign the binary relation symbols of Tarski’s extended first-order logic to binary
relations in a proper relation algebra. According to the Routley-Meyer definition,
a formula is verified under this assignment if and only if it evaluates (under the
interpretation of its connectives as operations on binary relations) to a relation that
contains the identity relation. Therefore a formula A is verified in a proper relation
algebra if and only if
∀x(A(x, x))
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is true under this assignment. What does this mean for an implication? An impli-
cation A→ B is verified if and only if
∀x((A→ B)(x, x)),
or the equivalent sentence
∀x∀y(A(x, y)→ B(x, y)),
is true. These sentences assert that the relation denoted by A is included in the
relation denoted by B. The verified implications are the inclusions between binary
relations obtained by interpreting the conectives as operations on binary relations.
All this is standard operating procedure in the theory of relation algebras. Ever
since Tarski’s and Lyndon’s work in the 1950s, it has been a relevant question to
ask for every relation algebra, is it isomorphic to a proper relation algebra (i.e.,
representable)? And if it is, what does that say about the binary relations in it?
Theorems asserting that relation algebras are representable are among the most
important parts of the subject. Tarski’s early QRA Theorem is a prime example. If
Tarski’s axioms for relation algebras had turned out to be complete, then his long
and difficult theorem would have become pointless. Tarski’s QRA Theorem (see [58,
VII] or [59, 8.4(iii)] or [28, Theorem 427]) asserts that if a relation algebra contains
a pair of quasi-projections (elements that behave like projection functions) then it is
representable. The QRA Theorem follows from the main result of the Tarski-Givant
book, called the Main Mapping Theorem for L× and L+n [59, 4.4(xxxiii)(xxxiv)],
[28, Theorem 574]. The Main Mapping Theorem says that if a theory, formalized
in first-order logic, proves the existence of a pair of functions acting sufficiently like
projection functions (from ordered pairs to their components), then that theory
can be formalized as a equational theory in the language of relation algebras. This
enables Tarski’s formalization of set theory without variables ([57], [59, §4.6]).
To recall the characterization of Tarski’s axioms, let E4 be the equations provable
in Tarski’s extended system of first-order logic of equality and other binary relations
restricted to four variables. This class of equations is axiomatized by Tarski’s
axioms for relation algebras together with the rules of deduction for equational
logic. These equations contain the entire range of operations used by the nineteenth
century algebraic logicians: union, intersection, complementation, converse, relative
multiplication, and a distinguished identity relation. We might call E4 “Tarski’s
equational logic” (for relation algebras).
Applying this characterization with the reduced set of operations available in
relevance logic produces Tarski’s relevance logic L4. By definition, L4 consists
of those formulas for which ∀x(A(x, x)) is provable in first-order logic of binary
relations restricted to four variables. Unlike E4, the formulas in L4 contain only the
operations corresponding to the connectives of relevance logic: union, intersection,
converse-complementation, and residuation. Note that relative multiplication and
residuation can be defined from each other using converse-complementation. On
the other hand, complementation and converse (the Routley star) do not occur in
the formulas in L4.
This definition of L4 is precise enough to demonstrate what formulas are in L4,
what derived rules of inference it is closed under, and what formulas are not in
L4. The exact choice of logical axioms for first-order logic doesn’t really matter,
as experience has shown. One can quibble about what 4-variable logic should be.
For example, respelling of bound variables is usually presented as a consequence of
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the logical axioms, but its proof requires extra variables not occurring in a given
sentence, and these may not exist if all four variables already occur in a sentence.
Respelling of bound variables can be excluded or explicitly included, but the result is
the same. For the sake of avoiding such questions and the notational complexities of
quantifiers, a sequent calculus was employed in [24], as will be done here. (Another
good option are proofs by natural deduction, restricted to examination of at most
four objects at once.) Some of the rules from [24] can be used directly (the structural
rules and ones for ∧ and ∨), while new rules are formulated for the connectives ∼
and →. The resulting proofs are close in appearance to informing reasoning using
at most four objects.
By [24, Theorems 2] for n = 4 (or n = 3), a formula is provable with four (or
three) variables, using the complete set of rules in [24], if and only if the correspond-
ing equation is true in all relation algebras by [24, Theorems 5] (or semi-associative
relation algebras by [24, Theorems 4]). The rules used here are a proper subset of
the rules in [24], or are the result of the combined application of two rules from [24],
as is the case for →|, |→, ∼|, and |∼. Consequently every formula in L4 (or L3)
corrsponds to an equation true in all relation algebras (or semi-associative relation
algebras). The correspondence is quite direct in [24]. An inclusion A ⊆ B is true in
all relation algebras if and only if the sequent A01⇒B01 is provable in 4-variable
logic. The equivalent condition here is that ⇒ (A→ B) 00 is provable in 4-variable
logic. These two sequents are interderivable, corresponding to the fact that one
relation is a subset of another if and only if their residual contains the identity
relation: A ⊆ B iff Id ⊆ A→ B.
2. The sequent calculus
Definition 1.
• Pv is a countable set whose elements p, q, r, · · · ∈ Pv are called proposi-
tional variables.
• Fmla is the closure of Pv under three binary operations ∨, ∧, and →, and
one unary operation ∼.
• The elements A,B,C,D, · · · ∈ Fmla are called formulas.
• The four elements of {0, 1, 2, 3} are called objects or indices.
• An assertion Aij is a formula A together with an ordered pair of individual
objects i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, added to the formula as subscripts.
Parentheses are omitted according to the convention that the operations are
applied in this order: ∼, ∧, ∨, and finally →. An assertion Aij should be read
as if it said 〈i, j〉 ∈ A, that is, A is a relation that holds between objects i and j.
In first-order logic an assertion might more commonly be written A(i, j), as was
done earlier. The subscript style of writing an assertion was common in nineteenth
century algebraic logic, and it reduces the burden of parentheses.
Definition 2.
• A sequent Γ⇒∆ is an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉 of sets of assertions Γ and ∆.
• The sequent Γ⇒∆ is an Axiom if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅.
• A 4-proof is a finite sequence of sequents in which every sequent is either
an Axiom or follows from one or two previous sequents by one of the rules
of inference shown in Figure 1: Cut, Weakening, ∨|, |∨, ∧|, |∧, ∼|, |∼,
→|, and, if k does not appear in Γ ∪∆, |→.
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Γ, Aij⇒∆, Aij
Axiom
Γ⇒∆, Aij
Aij ,Γ
′⇒∆′
Γ,Γ′⇒∆,∆′
Cut
Γ⇒∆
Γ,Γ′⇒∆,∆′
Weakening
Γ, Aij⇒∆
Γ′, Bij⇒∆
′
Γ,Γ′, (A ∨B) ij⇒∆,∆
′
∨|
Γ⇒∆, Aij , Bij
Γ⇒∆, (A ∨B) ij
|∨
Γ, Aij , Bij⇒∆
Γ, (A ∧B)ij⇒∆
∧|
Γ⇒∆, Aij
Γ′⇒∆′, Bij
Γ,Γ′⇒∆,∆′, (A ∧B)ij
|∧
Γ⇒∆, Aij
Γ, (∼A) ji⇒∆
∼|
Γ, Aij⇒∆
Γ⇒∆, (∼A) ji
|∼
Γ⇒∆, Aki
Γ′, Bkj⇒∆
′
Γ,Γ′, (A→ B) ij⇒∆,∆
′
→|
Γ, Aki⇒∆, Bkj
Γ⇒∆, (A→ B) ij , no k
|→
Figure 1. Rules and Axioms for Tarski’s relevance logic
The restriction to finite proofs in Definition 2 is motivated by the fact that a
rule can “do nothing”. For example, every sequent follows from itself by Weakening
(take Γ′ = ∆′ = ∅), Without the restriction, the infinite Z-indexed sequence in
which every sequent is A01⇒B01 would be a “proof” of A01⇒B01. Abbreviations
used in the notation for sequents is standard. For example,
∆,Γ, A⇒∆′,Γ′, B, C
is short for
∆ ∪ Γ ∪ {A}⇒∆′ ∪ Γ′ ∪ {B,C}.
A sequent Γ⇒∆ should be read, “If all the assertions in Γ are true, then one of
the assertions in ∆ is true.” For example, the sequent Aij⇒Bij should be read,
“If 〈i, j〉 ∈ A then 〈i, j〉 ∈ B”. Under this reading, together with the intended
interpretation of the connectives as set-theoretical operations, it is easy to see why
all the rules in Figure 1 are correct. In particular, the rule |→ requires that k 6= i, j
and k does not occur as a subscript in any assertion in Γ or ∆, as indicated by the
notation “no k”. The reason for this is the universal quantifier in the definition
of residuation, and is reflected in one of the common logical validities used in
axiomatizations of first-order logic, namely ∀x(ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ∀xψ), where it is
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Lemma Objects Formula
L(1) {0} A ∨ ∼A
L(2) {0, 1} A→ A
L(3) {0, 1} A ∧B → A
L(4) {0, 1} A ∧B → B
L(5) {0, 1} A→ A ∨B
L(6) {0, 1} B → A ∨B
L(7) {0, 1} B ∨ A→ A ∨B
L(8) {0, 1} B ∧ A→ A ∧B
L(9) {0, 1} (A ∧B) ∧ C → A ∧ (B ∧ C)
L(10) {0, 1} (A ∨B) ∨ C → A ∨ (B ∨ C)
L(11) {0, 1} A ∧ (B ∨ C)→ (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C)
L(12) {0, 1} (A→ ∼C) ∧ (B → C)→ ∼(A ∧B)
L(13) {0, 1} (A→ ∼B) ∧ (∼A→ ∼C)→ ∼B ∨ ∼C
L(14) {0, 1} ∼∼A→ A
L(15) {0, 1} A→ ∼∼A
L(16) {0, 1} ∼(A ∨B)→ ∼A ∧ ∼B
L(17) {0, 1} ∼(A ∧B)→ ∼A ∨ ∼B
L(18) {0, 1} ∼A ∧ ∼B → ∼(A ∨B)
L(19) {0, 1} ∼A ∨ ∼B → ∼(A ∧B)
L(20) {0, 1} ((A→ A)→ B)→ B
Table 1. Formulas in Tarski’s relevance logic, provable with 1 or 2 objects
required that x does not occur free in ϕ. In proofs that a formula belongs to L4, the
notation “no k” will accompany every application of rule |→, explicitly identifying
the universally quantified object.
Definition 3.
• A 4-proof of the sequent Γ⇒∆ is a 4-proof in which Γ⇒∆ appears.
We write
⊢4 Γ⇒∆
just in case Γ⇒∆ has a 4-proof.
• A 4-proof of the formula A is a 4-proof of the sequent ⇒A00.
• L4 is the set of formulas that have 4-proofs:
L4 = {A : ⊢
4 ⇒A00}.
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Lemma Objects Formula
L(21) {0, 1, 2} (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ B ∧ C)
L(22) {0, 1, 2} (A→ C) ∧ (B → C)→ (A ∨B → C)
L(23) {0, 1, 2} (A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∧C → B ∧D)
L(24) {0, 1, 2} (A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∨C → B ∨D)
L(25) {0, 1, 2} (A→ B) ∨ (C → D)→ (A ∧C → B ∨D)
L(26) {0, 1, 2} A→ (∼B → ∼(A→ B))
L(27) {0, 1, 2} A→ (B → ∼(A→ ∼B))
A→ (B → A ◦B)
L(28) {0, 1, 2} A→ ((∼B → ∼A)→ B)
L(29) {0, 1, 2} A→ ((B → ∼A)→ ∼B)
L(30) {0, 1, 2} ∼((A→ B)→ ∼A)→ B
(A→ B) ◦A→ B
L(31) {0, 1, 2} ∼A→ ((B → A)→ ∼B))
L(32) {0, 1, 2} ∼(A→ ∼B) ∧ C → ∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B)
∨ ∼(A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)))
(A ◦B) ∧ C → ((A ∧ ∼D) ◦B) ∨ (A ◦ (B ∧ (D ◦ C)))
L(33) {0, 1, 2} (A→ B) ∧∼ (C → ∼D)→ ∼(C ∧B → ∼D)
∨ ∼(C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A))
(A→ B) ∧ (C ◦D)→ ((C ∧B) ◦D) ∨ (C ◦ (D ∧ ∼A))
L(34) {0, 1, 2, 3} (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B))
L(35) {0, 1, 2, 3} (B → (C → A))→ (∼(B → ∼C)→ A)
(B → (C → A))→ ((B ◦ C)→ A)
L(36) {0, 1, 2, 3} (∼(A→ ∼B)→ C)→ (A→ (B → C))
((A ◦B)→ C)→ (A→ (B → C))
L(37) {0, 1, 2, 3} (A→ B)→ (∼(A→ C)→ ∼(B → C))
(A→ B)→ ((A ◦D)→ (B ◦D))
L(38) {0, 1, 2, 3} (A ◦B) ◦ C → A ◦ (B ◦ C)
Table 2. Formulas in Tarski’s relevance logic, provable with 3 or 4 objects
3. Tables of formulas and rules
Tables 1 and 2 show more than three dozen formulas in L4. Each entry begins
with the number in parentheses, preceded by “L”, of the lemma in which that
formula is shown to have a 4-proof. For example, the proof of Lemma 1 is a 4-proof
of formula L(1). In a 4-proof, every sequent is either an Axiom or follows from the
one or two sequents immediately preceding it according to the rule mentioned to
the right. Line numbers in 4-proofs are included whenever the justifying sequents
are not the previous one or two. The second entry in Tables 1 and 2 is a list of the
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Lemma Objects Rule
L(39) {0} A, B ⊢ A ∧B
L(40) {0} A→ B, A ⊢ B
L(41) {0} A ∨B, ∼A ⊢ B
L(42) {0, 1} A→ B, B → C ⊢ A→ C
L(43) {0, 1} A→ B ⊢ ∼B → ∼A
L(44) {0, 1} A→ ∼B ⊢ B → ∼A
L(45) {0, 1} A ∧B → C, B → C ∨ A ⊢ B → C
L(46) {0, 1} A ⊢ (A→ B)→ B
L(47) {0, 1, 2} A→ B ⊢ (B → C)→ (A→ C)
L(48) {0, 1, 2} A→ (B → C) ⊢ B → (∼C → ∼A)
L(49) {0, 1, 2, 3} A→ B ⊢ (C → A)→ (C → B)
L(50) {0, 1, 2, 3} A→ B, C → D ⊢ (B → C)→ (A→ D)
L(51) {0, 1, 2, 3} A→ B, C → D ⊢ (A ◦ C)→ (B ◦D)
A→ B, C → D ⊢ ∼(A→ ∼C)→ ∼(B → ∼D)
Table 3. Some derived rules of inference in Tarski’s relvance logic
objects that are actually used in the 4-proof of the formula. This provides a rough
classification of the formulas into those belonging to what we might call L1, L2,
L3, and L4, depending on the number of objects needed for their 4-proofs.
All of the formulas in L4 make assertions about binary relations that are uni-
versally true. As was observed earlier, the verification of a formula of the form
A → B in every proper relation algebra confirms that A ⊆ B, no matter how the
propositional variables in A and B are interpreted as binary relations. For example,
formula L(2) asserts the universal truth that for every binary relation A, A ⊆ A,
while L(3) asserts that for all binary relations A and B, A ∩B ⊆ A, as one would
expect if the interpretation of ∧ is intersection.
Table 3 shows more than a dozen derived rules of inference in L4. Each entry
begins with “L” and the number in parentheses of the lemma in which the rule
is shown to have a 4-proof under the assumption that the inputs to the rule have
4-proofs. For example, the proof of Lemma 39 shows how to assemble 4-proofs of A
and B into a 4-proof of A ∧B. The second entry in Table 3 is a list of the objects
needed for this assembly. Of course the 4-proofs of A and B may use all available
objects, but if not, then the second entry in the table shows what additional objects,
if any, might be required. Again, this provides a rough classification of the rules
into those belonging to L1, L2, L3, and L4.
4. Comparisons with other systems
Tables 1, 2, and 3 help locate Tarski’s relevance logic in the pantheon of relevance
logics. There is a very great contrast here between Tarski’s relevance logic and the
usual world of relevance logics. Indeed, the situation is well expressed by the
following quotations.
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“Old friends of our project will be surprised to find that we were
forced to split the book into two volumes – in order, of course,
to avoid weighing the reader down either literally or financially –
when we finally realized that the universe of relevance logics had
expanded unnoticed overnight.” [2, p. xxiii]
“This book mentions or discusses so many different systems (Meyer
claims the count exceeds that of the number of ships in Iliad II)
that we have been driven . . . to try to devise a reasonably rational
nomenclature.” [2, p. xxv]
“Additional axiom schemes drawn from the following lists may be
added to basic system B . . . singly or in combination to yield a
wealth of stronger systems:–” [50, p. 288]
“The following postulates are added . . . , singly or in combination,
to provide modellings for the wealth of further systems of sentential
logics introduced in the previous section.” [50, p. 300]
“In this chapter we first present algebraic analyses for an important
and extensive class of affixing systems: the class comprises not
only a great many relevant logics including all the more standard
systems but also all the usual irrelevant logics and some unusual
ones as well” [4, p. 72]
Tarski’s relevance logic L4 does not have this sort of variation. There is no list
of formulas and rules from which to choose “singly or in combination”. The only
available parameter is the number of variables used to prove any particular formula
or deductive rule expressing a property of binary relations. The most interesting
cases are when the number of variables is 1, 2, 3, or 4. The logic L1 already has the
Law of the Excluded Middle, and among its rules are Adjunction, modus ponens,
and Disjunctive Syllogism. The logic L2 picks up all the formulas in Table 1 (many
of which are part of various systems of Basic Logic), plus some more rules from
Table 3, such as the Rules of Transitivity, Contraposition, and Cut. The logic L3
adds to this list the Rule of Suffixing, for example, along with some key formulas
governing conjunction, disjunction, and fusion. However, the associative law for
fusion is missing from L3, along with those axioms (such as Suffixing) and rules
(such as Prefixing) from Tables 3 and 4 whose sequent proofs require four objects.
(These omissions can be proved by examining semi-associative relation algebras
that are not associative, hence not relation algebras, which fail to satisfy the the
appropriate rules and equations). The logic L5, however, is (or, at least, has been)
well beyond the consideration of even the most ardent inventors of systems.
Even L4 misses standard axioms used in various relevance logics. Such axioms
can be added, perhaps yielding a “wealth of systems”. L4 is a “naturally occurring”
system. The motivation for studying L4 certainly involves relevance logics. But
L4 arises from entirely different considerations. Indeed, Tarski’s relevance logic L4
may satisfy van Benthem’s [60] suggestion that
“. . . , the Routley semantics still has to prove its mettle. On the
realistic side, its model structures ought to admit of, if not a natu-
ral linguistic anchoring, then at least one mathematical ‘standard
example’, providing some food for independent reflection.”
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Perhaps Tarski’s relevance logic should be considered as a “standard mathematical
example.”
5. Basic logic
Tarski’s relevance logic contains the Basic Logic B of [4] and [50]. The axioms
of Basic Logic in [50, pp. 287–8] are A1–A9, and its rules are R1–R5, with R3′ as
an alternative to rules R3 and R4. In Tables 1 and 2, A1 is L(2), A2 is L(3), A3 is
L(4), A4 is L(21), A5 is L(5), A6 is L(6), A7 is L(22), A8 is L(11), and A9 is L(14).
The rules of Basic Logic in [50, pp. 287–8] are derived rules of inference in Tarski’s
relevance logic. In Table 3, R1 is L(40), R2 is L(39), R3′ is L(50), R3 is L(47), R4
is L(49), and R5 is L(44). The axioms of Basic Logic in [4, pp. 192–3] are A1–A9,
the same as axioms A1–A9 of [50, pp. 287–8]. The rules of Basic Logic in [4, p. 193]
are R1–R4, where R1 is L(40), R2 is L(39), R3 is L(50), and R4 is L(44). Rule R5
in [4, p. 192–3] is part of systems E and EW; R5 is L(46). Axiom A13 of system
TW in [4, p. 193] is L(34). Axiom A17 of systems DK and TK in [4, p. 193] is L(1).
6. Properties of binary relations
All the formulas and rules of inference in Tarki’s relevance logic are true for
arbitrary binary relations. They are verified in all proper relation algebras. More
generally, they hold in every algebra of the form
K = 〈K,∪,∩,→,∼〉 ,
where K is a set of binary relations on some set U , and K is closed under union ∪,
intersection ∩, residuation →, and converse-complementation ∼. This means that
if the propositional variables in a formula A in Tarski’s relevance logic are assigned
to binary relations in K, then the binary relation assigned to A will contain the
identity relation on U . Conversely, any formula that holds in every such algebra K
will be part of Tarski’s relevance logic if it can be proved by looking at no more than
four objects at a time. Thus, formulas not belonging to Tarski’s relevance logic are
of two kinds. They are either valid for all binary relations but require more than
five objects to prove, or else they postulate properties of binary relations that do
not hold in general.
Here are some examples of formulas expressing special properties of binary rela-
tions; for details see [15]. The axiom of contraposition,
(8) (A→ ∼B)→ (B → ∼A)
holds in K if and only if the relations in K commute with each other under rela-
tive multiplication, i.e., fusion is commutative. The same applies to the axiom of
permutation,
(9) (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C)).
Commutativity of K is enough to insure that the suffixing and modus ponens axioms
(A→ B)→ ((B → C)→ (A→ C))(10)
A→ ((A→ B)→ B)(11)
hold in K, but neither of them is equivalent to assuming K is commutative. The
contraction axiom and the reductio axiom
(A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B)(12)
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(A→ ∼A)→ ∼A(13)
are each equivalent to assuming every relation in K is dense. The R-mingle axiom
(14) A→ (A→ A)
holds in K if and only if every relation in K is transitive.
7. System R
An axiom set for the Anderson-Belnap system R of relevant implication is pre-
sented by Routley-Meyer [49, p. 204]. It contains axioms A1–A13 along with axioms
A14 and A15 [49, p. 224] when fusion ◦ is included as primitive rather than defined
as in (D1). Eleven of these fifteen axioms occur in Tarski’s relevance logic. In
Tables 1 and 2, A1 is L(2), A5 is L(3), A6 is L(4), A7 is L(21), A8 is L(5), A9 is
L(6), A10 is L(22), A11 is L(11), A13 is L(14), A14 is L(27), and A15 is L(35). The
remaining four axioms of R (A2, A3, A4, A12) do not occur in Tarski’s relevance
logic: A2 is (11), A3 is (10), A4 is (12), and A12 is (8). The rules for R are L(39) and
L(40), both part of Tarski’s relevance logic. If Tarski’s relevance logic is extended
by adding axioms A1–A15, then all formulas of the logic R of Anderson-Belnap [2]
become provable; see [30, Corollary 5.2(i)].
Adding axioms to L4 may be done by supplementing the rules in Figure 1. For
example, to add (8), one may include the rule
Γ, (A→ ∼B) ij⇒∆, (B → ∼A) ij
Contraposition
8. System R-mingle
If Tarski’s relevance logic is extended by adding the axioms (8), (10), (11), (12),
and (14), the result is the Dunn-McCall system R-mingle. R-mingle contains ev-
ery formula valid for transitive dense commutative binary relations, no matter how
many objects are needed for its proof. This is just a restatement of [30, The-
orem 6.2]. (See [15] for another proof.) In more detail, A → B is a theorem
of R-mingle if and only if the inclusion A ⊆ B is true whenever all its proposi-
tional variables are interpreted as relations in a set K of dense transitive binary
relations, where K is closed under union, intersection, residation, and converse-
complementation (the interpretations of the connectives in A→ B) and K is com-
mutative under relative multiplication. The underlying reason is that, as Meyer
proved [2, Corollaries 3.1, 3.5, p. 413–4], the theorems of R-mingle are the formu-
las valid in all Sugihara matrices, and all Sugihara matrices are representable as
sets of transitive dense binary relations, commutative under relative multiplication
[15, 30]. An informal mnemonic for this result might be
R-mingle = L∞ + all relations are dense, transitive, and commute under ◦.
This completeness result involves binary relations and their natural operations.
R-mingle is the set of laws (expressible with ∩, ∪, →, ∼) that hold for all transi-
tive, dense, commutative binary relations. Perhaps this provides another standard
mathematical example of a relevance logic, as van Benthem suggested, although
sometimes R-mingle is not regarded as a true relevance logic because of Meyer’s
result [2, RM84, p. 417] that R-mingle has only the weak variable sharing property
that if A→ B is a theorem of R-mingle then either A and B share a propositional
variable or ∼A and B are both theorems of R-mingle.
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9. System L5
Given Lyndon’s initial result and the non-finite axiomatizability results that
followed, starting with Monk’s [38] proof that the equational theory of representable
relation algebras is not finitely based, it was easy to suspect that formulas must exist
that are valid for all binary relations but are not in Tarski’s relevance logic because
they require more than five objects to prove; see [29], [30, (Q1), p. 52]. Indeed,
Mikula´s [35] proved such a non-finite axiomatizability result for relevance logic.
The formulas involved are complicated and not generally considered as potential
axioms for relevance logics. Two formulas that are not theorems of R are given in
[30, Theorem 8.2]. Here is the shorter one. (Because of the associativity of ◦, one
set of parentheses has been omitted from the final term.)((
(A34 ◦A23) ∧ A24
)
◦
(
(A12 ◦A01) ∧ A02
))
∧ A04
→
((
(A34 ◦A23) ∧ A24
)
◦
((
A12 ◦ [A01 ∧ ∼A01]
)
∧A02
))
∧ A04
∨
(((
[A34 ∧ ∼A34] ◦A23
)
∧ A24
)
◦
(
(A12 ◦A01) ∧A02
))
∧A04
∨ A34 ◦
(
(A23 ◦A12) ∧
((
(A23 ◦A02) ∧ (A43 ◦A04)
)
◦A10
)
∧
(
A43 ◦
(
(A04 ◦A10) ∧ (A24 ◦A12)
)))
◦A01
The subscripts on the variables indicate which objects should appear as subscripts
in assertions based on that formula. For example, the assertion (A24) 24 will appear
in a properly constructed 5-proof.
10. Relevant model structures
Relevant model structures [49, §2] provide sound and complete semantics for
system R. We will use them to show various formulas are not in R or not in L4.
Definition 4. A relevant model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉 consists of a non-
empty set K, a ternary relation R ⊆ K3, a unary operation ∗ : K → K, and a
distinguished element 0 ∈ K, such that postulates (p1)–(p6) hold for all a, b, c ∈ K,
where
R2abcd iff ∃x(Rabx and Rxcd),(d1)
R2a(bc)d iff ∃x(Rbcx and Raxd).(d2)
R0aa (0-reflexivity)(p1)
Raaa (density)(p2)
R2abcd⇒R2acdb(p3)
R20abc⇒Rabc (0-cancellation)(p4)
Rabc⇒Rac∗b∗(p5)
a∗∗ = a (involution)(p6)
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By [30, Theorem7.1], K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉 is a relevant model structure if and only if
it satisfies (p1), (p2), (p3′), (p4), (p5′), (p6), and (comm), where
Rabc⇒Rbac (commutativity)(comm)
R2abcd⇒R2a(bc)d (associativity)(p3′)
Rabc⇒Rc∗ab∗ (rotation)(p5′)
Definition 5. Let K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉 be a relevant model structure. A valuation in
K is a function ν : Pv×K → {T, F} such that, for all a, b ∈ K and p ∈ Pv, if R0ab
and ν(p, a) = T then ν(p, b) = T . I is the interpretation associated with ν if
I : Fmla×K → {T, F}, and for all A,B ∈ Fmla and c ∈ K,
(i) I(p, c) = ν(p, c),
(ii) I(A ∧B, c) = T iff I(A, c) = T and I(B, c) = T,
(iii) I(A ∨B, c) = T iff I(A, c) = T or I(B, c) = T,
(iv) I(A→ B, c) = T iff for all a, b, if Rcab and I(A, a) = T then I(B, b) = T ,
(v) I(A ◦B, c) = T iff for some a, b, Rabc, I(A, a) = T , and I(B, b) = T ,
(vi) I(∼A, c) = T iff I(A, c∗) = F.
A formula A is true on a valuation ν, or on the associated I, at c ∈ K if I(A, c) =
T , and false on ν at c if I(A, c) = F . A formula A is verified on ν, or on the
associated I, if I(A, 0) = T , otherwise falsified. A formula A is valid in K if A is
verified on every valuation in K, and R-valid if A is valid in every relevant model
structure, otherwise R-invalid.
Condition (v) follows from (iv) and (vi) when definition (D1) is used instead of
taking ◦ as primitive; see [49, footnote 10, p. 206]. By [49, Theorem 2], all theorems
of R are R-valid, and by [49, Theorem 3], all R-valid formulas are theorems of R. A
relevant model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉 is normal if 0∗ = 0 [49, p. 218]. By [49,
Theorem 4], a formula A is a theorem of R if and only if A is valid in every normal
relevant model structure.
Definition 6. Given a relevant model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉, define operations
◦, →, ∗, and ∼ on subsets X,Y ⊆ K by
X ◦ Y = {z : Rxyz for some x ∈ X and y ∈ Y },(15)
X → Y = {z : if Rzxy and x ∈ X then y ∈ Y },(16)
X∗ = {z∗ : z ∈ X},(17)
∼X = K \X∗.(18)
For any valuation ν in K with associated interpretation I, let
Jν(A) = J(A) = {c : I(A, c) = T }
for every formula A.
These operations (and their notation) are designed for the following consequences
of Definition 5. For all formulas A and B,
J(A ∧B) = J(A) ∩ J(B),
J(A ∨B) = J(A) ∪ J(B),
J(A→ B) = J(A)→ J(B),
J(A ◦B) = J(A) ◦ J(B),
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K1 =
◦ {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{0} {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{a} {a} {0, a, b} {b, b∗} {a, b, b∗}
{b} {b} {b, b∗} {a, b, b∗} {0, a, b, b∗}
{b∗} {b∗} {a, b, b∗} {0, a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗}
K2 =
◦ {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{0} {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{a} {a} {0, a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗}
{b} {b} {a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗} {0, a, b, b∗}
{b∗} {b∗} {a, b, b∗} {0, a, b, b∗} {a, b∗}
K3 =
◦ {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{0} {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{a} {a} {0, a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗}
{b} {b} {a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗} {0, a, b, b∗}
{b∗} {b∗} {a, b, b∗} {0, a, b, b∗} {a, b, b∗}
Table 4. Three normal relevant model structures.
J(∼A) = ∼J(A),
and A is valid in K if 0 ∈ J(A) for every valuation on K. Some useful observations
to make at this point are, for all X,Y ⊆ K,
• X ◦ ∅ = ∅ ◦X = ∅,
• X ◦ (Y ∪ Z) = X ◦ Y ∪ X ◦ Z,
• (Y ∪ Z) ◦X = Y ◦X ∪ Z ◦X ,
• X → Y = ∼(X ◦ ∼Y ).
Every relevant model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉 has an associated algebra, called its
“complex algebra”. The elements of the complex algebra of K are all the subsets of
K, and the operations of the complex algebra are ∪, ∩, and the operations ◦, →,
and ∼ from Definition 6.
11. A formula in L3 but not R
Lemma 32 shows that L(32) in Table 2 is in Tarski’s relevance logic L4. In fact,
this formula is already part of L3. However, L(32) is not a theorem of R. Here we
present two normal relevant model structures that invalidate an instance of L(32),
namely A→ B, where p, q, r, s ∈ Pv,
A = (p ◦ q) ∧ r,
B = ((p ∧ ∼s) ◦ q) ∨ (p ◦ (q ∧ (s ◦ r))).
Let K = {0, a, b, b∗}, where |K| = 4, 0∗ = 0, a∗ = a, and ∗ interchanges b and
b∗, as suggested by the notation. Two relevant model structures on K, K1 and K2,
are obtained by using two ternary relations R on K. The ternary relation for K1
has 34 triples, while the ternary relation for K2 has 36 triples. Table 4 lists the
◦-products of all singleton subsets of K in both structures. The products for larger
sets can be computed by using the distributive laws listed above. The triples can
be read from the tables. For example, 〈a, a, b∗〉 is a triple in the ternary relation
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of K2 but not K1 because b
∗ ∈ {0, a, b, b∗} = {a} ◦ {a} in the table for K2, while
b∗ /∈ {0, a, b} = {a} ◦ {a} in the table for K1.
Neither K1 nor K2 is the atom structure of a relation algebra. Their ternary
relations fail to have the property, possessed by all atom structures of relation
algebras, that Rxyz ↔ Rzy∗x. In K1, the triples 〈a, a, b〉, 〈a, b
∗, a〉, and 〈b∗, a, a〉
are present, but 〈b, a, a〉, 〈a, b, a〉, and 〈a, a, b∗〉 are missing. In K2, 〈b, b, b∗〉 is present
but 〈b∗, b∗, b〉 is missing. Adding the missing triples to either structure produces
K3 in Table 4.
Now we proceed to use K1 and K2 to show that L(32) in Table 2 is not a theorem
of R. For K1, choose valuation ν so that J(p) = J(s) = {a}, that is,
ν(p, a) = ν(s, a) = T,
ν(p, 0) = ν(s, 0) = ν(p, b) = ν(p, b∗) = ν(s, b) = ν(s, b∗) = F.
Then J(∼s) = {0, b, b∗} so
J(p ∧ ∼s) = {a} ∩ {0, b, b∗} = ∅,
hence
J((p ∧ ∼s) ◦ q) = J(p ∧∼s) ◦ J(q) = ∅ ◦ J(q) = ∅,
regardless of the action of ν on q. Let J(q) = {a}. Then
J(p ◦ q) = J(p) ◦ J(q) = {a} ◦ {a} = {0, a, b}.
Next, let J(r) = {b}. Then
J(s ◦ r) = J(s) ◦ J(r) = {a} ◦ {b} = {b, b∗},
J(q ∧ (s ◦ r)) = J(q) ∩ J(s ◦ r) = {a} ∩ {b, b∗} = ∅.
This last equation gives us
J(p ◦ (q ∧ (s ◦ r))) = J(p) ◦ J(q ∧ (s ◦ r)) = J(p) ◦ ∅ = ∅,
regardless of our choice for J(p), and this, together with J((p ∧∼s) ◦ q) = ∅, gives
us
J(B) = J((p ∧ ∼s) ◦ q) ∪ J(p ◦ (q ∧ (s ◦ r))) = ∅ ∪ ∅ = ∅.
However, we also have
J(A) = J((p ◦ q) ∧ r)
= J(p ◦ q) ∩ J(r)
= {0, a, b} ∩ {b}
= {b}
Now, by definition, A→ B is verified if I(A→ B, 0) = T . This means that for all
x, y ∈ K, if R0xy and I(A, x) = T then I(B, y) = T . However, from the table we
have {0} ◦ {b} = {b}, which tells us that R0bb by the definition of the operation
◦, and I(A, b) = T since J(A) = {b}, so we ought to have I(B, b) = T if A → B
were verified, but we don’t, because J(B) = ∅. By the Routley-Meyer completeness
results mentioned earlier, we conclude that A→ B is not a theorem of R.
For K2, we repeat all these steps, put with different values. Choose ν so that
J(p) = {b} and J(s) = {b∗}. Then J(∼s) = {0, a, b∗},
J(p ∧ ∼s) = {b} ∩ {0, a, b∗} = ∅,
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hence
J((p ∧ ∼s) ◦ q) = J(p ∧∼s) ◦ J(q) = ∅ ◦ J(q) = ∅,
regardless of the action of ν on q. Let J(q) = {b}. Then
J(p ◦ q) = J(p) ◦ J(q) = {b} ◦ {b} = {a, b, b∗}.
Let J(r) = {b∗}. Then
J(s ◦ r) = J(s) ◦ J(r) = {b∗} ◦ {b∗} = {a, b∗},
J(q ∧ (s ◦ r)) = J(q) ∩ J(s ◦ r) = {b} ∩ {a, b∗} = ∅,
hence
J(p ◦ (q ∧ (s ◦ r))) = J(p) ◦ J(q ∧ (s ◦ r)) = J(p) ◦ ∅ = ∅,
regardless of our choice for J(p). Together with J((p ∧ ∼s) ◦ q) = ∅, this gives us
J(B) = J((p ∧ ∼s) ◦ q) ∪ J(p ◦ (q ∧ (s ◦ r))) = ∅ ∪ ∅ = ∅.
We also have
J(A) = J((p ◦ q) ∧ r)
= J(p ◦ q) ∩ J(r)
= {a, b, b∗} ∩ {b}
= {b}
From the table we have {0} ◦ {b} = {b}, hence R0bb, and I(A, b) = T since J(A) =
{b}. We ought to get I(B, b) = T if A → B were verified, but we don’t since
J(B) = ∅. By the Routley-Meyer completeness results, A→ B is not a theorem of
R.
By the way, all three relevant model structures K1, K2, and K3 validate formulas
(8), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13), but (14) is invalidated in many ways. For
example, choosing ν so that J(p) = {a} yields the same calculations in all three
structures:
J(p→ p) = J(p)→ J(p)
= ∼({a} ◦ ∼{a})
= ∼({a} ◦ {0, b, b∗})
= ∼{a, b, b∗}
= {0}
J(p→ (p→ p)) = ∼(J(p) ◦ ∼J(p→ p))
= ∼({a} ◦ ∼{0})
= ∼({a} ◦ {a, b, b∗})
= ∼{0, a, b, b∗}
= ∅
12. A normal relevant model structure on a 21-element group
The two normal relevant model structures K1 and K2 are the simplest of several
found by Prover9/Mace4 [31]. Although neither of them is the atom structure of a
relation algebra, they turn out to be very nearly the same proper relation algebra.
If three more triples are added to K1, namely 〈b, a, a〉, 〈a, b, a〉, and 〈a, a, b
∗〉, or if
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a = {f, f2, g, g2, g5, g6}
b = b∗ =
{fg, f2g, fg2, fg3, g4, fg4, fg6} {g3, f2g2, f2g3, f2g4, fg5, f2g5, f2g6}
{fg, g3, fg3, fg4, fg5, fg6, f2g6} {f2g, fg2, f2g2, g4, f2g3, f2g4, f2g5}
{fg, g3, fg3, f2g4, fg5, f2g5, f2g6} {f2g, fg2, f2g2, g4, f2g3, fg4, fg6}
{fg, f2g2, g4, fg4, f2g4, fg5, f2g6} {f2g, fg2, g3, fg3, f2g3, f2g5, fg6}
{fg, fg3, g4, f2g4, fg5, f2g5, f2g6} {f2g, fg2, g3, f2g2, f2g3, fg4, fg6}
a = {f, f2, fg, fg2, f2g3, f2g6}
b = b∗ =
{g, f2g, g3, f2g2, fg4, g5, f2g4} {g2, fg3, g4, fg5, g6, f2g5, fg6}
{g, f2g, g3, f2g2, fg4, g5, fg6} {g2, fg3, g4, f2g4, fg5, g6, f2g5}
{g, f2g, g3, fg3, fg4, g5, fg6} {g2, f2g2, g4, f2g4, fg5, g6, f2g5}
Table 5. Representations on K3 on a 21-element group.
one more triple is added to K2, namely 〈b∗, b∗, b〉, they both become the normal
relevant model structure K3, also shown in Table 4. K3 coincides with the relation
algebra called 3737 in [28]. This relation algebra is representable, as was first shown
by Stephen D. Comer [5], and is actually isomorphic to a proper relation algebra
whose base set is a 21-element group, first shown by Peter Jipsen.
Let G be the group generated by f and g, subject to the relations f3 = g7 = 1
and gf = fg2, where 1 is the identity element of G. Alternatively, let G be the
group generated by the permutations of {1, · · · , 21} defined by
f = (3, 6, 12)(5, 8, 14)(7, 10, 16)(9, 18, 15)(11, 20, 17)(13, 21, 19),
g = (2, 20, 17, 14, 11, 8, 5)(4, 16, 7, 19, 10, 21, 13).
Up to isomorphism, there are 8 ways (found by GAP [7]) to obtain K3 from G. First
let 0 = {1} be the singleton containing the identity element of G. Next, choose one
of the 8 partitions listed in Table 5 of the 20 non-identity elements into 3 sets a, b,
and b∗. Then 0 and a are closed under the formation of inverses in G, b is the set
of inverses of elements in b∗, and vice versa,
0 = {1−1} a = {h−1 : h ∈ a}, b∗ = {h−1 : h ∈ b}, b = {h−1 : h ∈ b∗}.
Here the Routley star ∗ is the operation of forming all the inverses of the elements
in a subset of G. For any x, y, z ∈ K = {0, a, b, b∗}, let the ternary relation R hold
on the triple 〈x, y, z〉 just in case z is included in the set products of elements from
x and y, that is,
Rxyz ↔ xy ⊇ z ↔ z ⊆ {hk : h ∈ x, k ∈ y},
where hk is the product in G of the two group elements h, k ∈ G and xy is the set
of products in G of pairs of elements, one from x and one from y, in that order.
This completes the construction of K3 from G. (Infinitely many other groups can
be used in a similar way; G is just the smallest one.) Every choice of partition from
Table 5 produces that same table for the operation ◦ in K3, as defined in (15) and
shown in Table 4.
To show that this relevant model structure K3 is isomorphic to a proper relation
algebra we use the right regular representation of the group G, as is done in the
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proof of the Cayley representation theorem (every group is isomorphic to a group
of permutations). First we recall that subsets of a group were once called “com-
plexes”, and the set of subsets of the group G forms an algebra called its “complex
algebra”, whose operations are union, intersection, complementation with respect
to G, multiplication of complexes as defined above, and the operation of forming all
the inverses of elements in a subset of G, here denoted by the Routley star ∗. The
complex algebra also has, as a distinguished element, the singleton consisting of
just the identity element of the group. For every x ⊆ G, define the binary relation
σ(x) on G by
σ(x) = {〈k, kh〉 : k ∈ G, h ∈ x} ⊆ G×G.
Then σ is an injective homomorphism from the complex algebra ofG into the proper
relation algebra of all binary relations on G, in the sense that, for all x, y ⊆ G,
recalling definitions (1) and (4), we have
σ(x ∪ y) = σ(x) ∪ σ(y),
σ(x ∩ y) = σ(x) ∩ σ(y),
σ(G \ x) = (G×G) \ σ(x),
σ(xy) = σ(x)|σ(y),
σ(x∗) = σ(x)−1,
σ({1}) = {〈h, h〉 : h ∈ G}.
If h ∈ G then σ({h}) is the permutation used in the proof of Cayley’s theorem. The
right regular representation has a property required by representations of relation
algebras: the permutations associated with {h} and {k} must be disjoint (as sets)
whenever h 6= k, simply because {h}∩{k} = ∅ and this fact must be reflected in any
representation. Applying σ to the elements of K3 produces four binary relations on
the 21-element set G,
σ(0) = {〈h, h〉 : h ∈ G}, A = σ(a), B = σ(b), B−1 = σ(b∗).
These four relations form a partition of G×G. One of them is the identity relation
on G, and the converse of any one of them is either itself or another one of them.
In particular, (σ(0))
−1
= σ(0) and A−1 = A, while B and B−1 are converses of
each other. The table for K3 yields these conclusions about the relative products
of these relations: σ(0)|x = x|σ(0) = x for all x ∈ {σ(0), A,B,B−1},
A|A = B|B−1 = B−1|B = G×G,
and all other products are equal to (G × G) \ σ(0). Any four relations with these
properties gives us yet another representation of the relation algebra 3737, alias K3.
13. Counterexample to a theorem of Kowalski
Kowalski [14, Theorem 8.1] proved, “The relevant logic R is sound and complete
with respect to square-increasing, commutative, integral relation algebras.” L(32)
is a counterexample to this theorem. It is not a theorem of R (because it is invalid
the the relevant model structures K1 and K2) and yet holds in all relation algebras
(including the square-increasing, commutative, integral ones). In fact, Lemma 32
shows that it is in L3 and is true in all semi-associative relation algebras (because
it is provable with only three objects).
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[14, Theorem 8.1] is obtained as an immediate consequence of [14, Theorem 7.1],
that “Every normal De Morgan monoid is embeddable as a bare [no constants] De
Morgan monoid into a square-increasing, commutative, integral relation algebra.”
The complex algebras of K1 and K2 are counterexamples to Theorem 7.1.
Part of the proof of Theorem 7.1 reads, “By definition of ε, it is an embedding
of the lattice reduct of [the normal De Morgan monoid] M into the lattice reduct
of [the relation algebra] UM ; in particular, ε is injective. Lemma 7.1 shows that the
multiplication, implication and De Morgan negation are preserved as well, . . . ”.
The proof of Theorem 7.1 uses Lemma 5.4 to show half of the preservation of
multiplication, namely ε(ab) ⊆ ε(a) ◦ ε(b).
The difficulty arises in the proof of Lemma 5.4(1) at this point: “Since M is a
distributive lattice, R is a prime filter and R′ = R, proving (1).” At this stage in
the proof, 〈R,R′〉 is known to be a maximal disjoint pair in S (hence R a proper
filter and R′ a proper ideal disjoint from R, and they satisfy two additional technical
conditions). If the desired conclusion that R = R′ were to fail, there would be some
element x /∈ R ∪ R′. A desired contradiction could then be attained by showing
that x could be added to R or to R′, i.e., either the filter generated by x and R is
disjoint from the ideal R′, or else the ideal generated by R′ and x is disjoint from
R. The distributivity of M insures that one of these two possibilities happens.
For example, if the filter R+ generated by x and R is disjoint from the ideal R′,
but the ideal generated by R′ and x is not disjoint from R, then 〈R+, R′〉 would
be a strictly larger disjoint filter-ideal pair. This would yield a contradiction if
〈R,R′〉 were maximal among all disjoint filter-ideal pairs, but it is only known to
be maximal in S (and subject to the technical conditions). The goal would be to
show that 〈R+, R′〉 is actually a strictly larger pair in S (that this pair also satisfies
the technical conditions). The difficulty in achieving this goal would be revealed by
a more detailed examination of this situation for the complex algebras of K1 and
K2.
14. Deriving L(32) from Tarski’s axioms
L(32) in Table 2 is shown to be in L3 by Lemma 32. It is the translation
into relevance logic notation of the following equation, which is true in all relation
algebras.
x;y · z ≤ (x · w˘);y + x;(y · w ;z).(19)
The equation (19) can therefore be derived from Tarski’s ten axioms for relation
algebras [59, 8,2(i)] (treated as algebras of the form
〈
U,+, , ; , ,˘ 1
,〉
). Tarski’s
axioms are
x+ y = y + x,(R1)
x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z,(R2)
x+ y + x+ y = x,(R3)
x;(y ;z) = (x;y);z,(R4)
(x+ y);z = x;z + y ;z,(R5)
x;1
,
= x,(R6)
˘˘x = x,(R7)
(x+ y)˘ = x˘+ y˘,(R8)
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(x;y)˘ = y˘ ;x˘,(R9)
x˘ ;x;y + y = y.(R10)
These are the axioms about which Tarski asked “whether this definition of relation
algebra . . . is justified in any intrinsic sense.”
The first three axioms are a set of postulates for Boolean algebras (treated as
algebras of the form
〈
U,+,
〉
) due to E. V. Huntington [11, 12, 13]. Proving all
the usual equations true in Boolean algebras from the Huntington axioms is an
interesting and challenging homework problem. One must first prove x+ x = y+ y
in order to define the maximum element 1 by 1 = x + x. (See [27] for a solution.)
We will prove the following purely relation-algebraic facts directly from Tarski’s
axioms. In the following proofs, any step that requires only Boolean algebra is
marked “BA”.
x ≤ y → x;z ≤ y ;z(20)
z ;(x+ y) = z ;x+ z ;y(21)
x ≤ y → z ;x ≤ z ;y(22)
1˘ = 1(23)
x˘ = x˘(24)
(x · y)˘ = x˘ · y˘(25)
x;y · z ≤ x;(y · x˘ ;z)(26)
Proof of (20):
x ≤ y ↔ x+ y = y BA
→ (x+ y);z = y ;z
↔ x;z + y ;z = y ;z (R5)
↔ x;z ≤ y ;z BA
Proof of (21):
z ;(x + y) = ((z ;(x+ y))˘ )˘ (R7)
= ((x+ y)˘ ; z˘)˘ (R9)
= ((x˘+ y˘); z˘)˘ (R8)
= (x˘; z˘ + y˘ ; z˘)˘ (R5)
= ((z ;x)˘ + (z ;y)˘ )˘ (R9)
= ((z ;x+ z ;y)˘ )˘ (R8)
= z ;x+ z ;y (R7)
The proof of (22) is like the proof of (21), but turned around in the obvious way.
Proof of (23):
1 = 1 + 1˘ BA
= ˘˘1 + 1˘ (R7)
=
(
1˘ + 1
)˘
(R8)
= 1˘ BA
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For (24), first note that, for any y, the following statements are equivalent.
x˘ ≤ y
x˘+ y = y BA
x+ y˘ = y˘ (R7), (R8)
x+ y˘ = 1 BA
x˘+ y = 1 (R7), (R8), (23)
x˘ ≤ y BA
We need only two instances of these equivalences. When y is either x˘ or x˘, we
deduce that x˘ ≤ x˘ and x˘ ≤ x˘, respectively, hence (24) holds. Proof of (25):
(x · y)˘ =
(
x+ y
)˘
BA
= (x+ y)˘ (24)
= x˘+ y˘ (R8)
= x˘+ y˘ (24)
= x˘ · y˘ BA
Proof of (26):
x;y = x;(y · (x˘ ;z + x˘;z)) BA
= x;(y · x˘ ;z + y · x˘ ;z) BA
= x;(y · x˘ ;z) + x;(y · x˘ ;z) (21)
≤ x;(y · x˘ ;z) + x;(x˘ ;z) (22)
≤ x;(y · x˘ ;z) + z (R10)
From the previous equation we get
x;y · z ≤ (x;(y · x˘;z) + z) · z BA
= x;(y · x˘ ;z) · z + z · z BA
= x;(y · x˘ ;z) · z + 0 BA
= x;(y · x˘ ;z) · z BA
Associativity is not needed in any form for the proof of (19). Consequently (19)
holds in all non-associative relation algebras (the class of algebras obtained by
dropping (R4) from the list of axioms). Here is a direct equational proof of (19).
x;y · z = (x · (w˘ + w˘));y · z BA
= (x · w˘ + x · w˘);y · z BA
= ((x · w˘);y + (x · w˘);y) · z (R5)
= (x · w˘);y · z + (x · w˘);y · z BA
≤ (x · w˘);y + (x · w˘);y · z BA
≤ (x · w˘);y + (x · w˘);(y · (x · w˘)˘ ;z) (26)
= (x · w˘);y + (x · w˘);(y · (x˘ · w);z) (25), (R7)
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K4 =
◦ {0} {a} {a∗}
{0} {0} {a} {a∗}
{a} {a} {a} {0, a, a∗}
{a∗} {a∗} {0, a, a∗} {a∗}
Table 6. Belnap’s normal relevant model structure.
≤ (x · w˘);y + x;(y · w ;z) (20), (22)
15. Variable-sharing
Tarski’s relevance logic has the variable-sharing property, even if extended be-
yond R by adding axioms insuring commutativity and density. Belnap’s [3] original
proof of this fact for the logic E of Anderson-Belnap [1] applies with no changes.
Belnap’s construction and proof are presented in this section. Belnap gave matrices
for ∧, ∨, →, ∼, and two defined unary connectives, N(A) = (A → A) → A and
M(A) = ∼(N(∼A)).
From the matrices for ∧ and ∨ it is apparent that the eight values appearing
in them, namely −3, −2, −1, −0, +0, +1, +2, and +3 (the last four are the
designated values), form a lattice isomorphic to the lattice of subsets of the 3-
element set {−1,+0,−2}, with +3 at the top and −3 at the bottom, if ∧ and ∨
are interpreted as intersection and union. This observation does not occur in [3],
but in subsequent literature they are usually protrayed this way; see, for example,
[2, pp. 198, 252], [50, p. 178], and [4, p. 102].
What took nearly half a century after their introduction in 1960 was the realiza-
tion in [29] that Belnap’s matrices define a proper relation algebra; see also [15, 30].
This proper relation algebra was known to Lyndon [23] in 1950, and became well
known in the 1980s under the name “The Point Algebra”, because it describes the
ways two points on the real line can be related to each other; the three atomic
relations between two real numbers are x < y, x = y, and x > y. The joins of pairs
of these relations are ≤, ≥, and 6=.
Two formulas A,B ∈ Sent are said to share a variable if some propositional
variable p ∈ Pv occurs in both A and B. To show A and B share a propositional
variable whenever A → B ∈ L4, we use the normal relevant model structure K4
shown in Table 6. Choose a valuation ν so that
J(p) =
{
{a} if p occurs in A,
{a∗} if p does not occur in A.
One key feature of K4 is that {{a}, {0, a}} and {{a∗}, {0, a∗}} are both closed under
∪, ∩, →, ◦, and ∼. This is obvious for ∪ and ∩, clear for ◦ from Table 6, easy
to check for ∼, and therefore is also true for →. The other key feature is that
X → Y = ∅ whenever X ∈ {{a}, {0, a}} and Y ∈ {{a∗}, {0, a∗}}. For this we
provide two sample computations.
{a} → {a∗} = ∼({a} ◦ ∼{a∗}) = ∼({a} ◦ {0, a∗})
= ∼{0, a, a∗} = K \ {0, a, a∗} = ∅,
{0, a} → {0, a∗} = ∼({0, a} ◦ ∼{0, a∗}) = ∼({0, a} ◦ {a∗})
= ∼{0, a, a∗} = K \ {0, a, a∗} = ∅.
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K5 =
◦ {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{0} {0} {a} {b} {b∗}
{a} {a} {0, a, b, b∗} {a, b} {a}
{b} {b} {a} {b} {0, a, b, b∗}
{b∗} {b∗} {a, b∗} {0, b, b∗} {b∗}
Table 7. A non-commutative normal relevant model structure
By the choice of ν, the closure of {{a}, {0, a}} give us
J(A) ∈ {{a}, {0, a}}.
Suppose that B is a formula whose propositional variables do not occur in A. Then,
by the choice of ν and the closure of {{a∗}, {0, a∗}},
J(B) ∈ {{a∗}, {0, a∗}}.
By the second key feature, we conclude that J(A→ B) = J(A)→ J(B) = ∅. Since
0 is not in ∅, A → B is not valid in K4. The contrapositive of what we have just
proved is that if A→ B is valid in K4, then A and B must share a variable.
16. Representing Belnap’s normal relevant model structure
A representation of K4 as the atom structure of a proper relation algebra can be
obtained as follows. Let Q be the set of rational numbers. Let
σ(a) = {〈x, y〉 : x < y, x, y ∈ Q},
σ(a∗) = {〈x, y〉 : x > y, x, y ∈ Q},
σ(0) = {〈x, y〉 : x = y, x, y ∈ Q}.
Extend σ to all subsets of K = {0, a, a∗}, by sending each subset of K to the union
of the images of its elements under σ. For example,
σ({a}) = σ(a),
σ({a, a∗}) = {〈x, y〉 : x 6= y, x, y ∈ Q},
σ({0, a}) = {〈x, y〉 : x ≤ y, x, y ∈ Q}.
Thus σ maps the complex algebra of K4 onto the proper relation algebra whose
universe consists of the eight binary relations on the rationals usually denoted in a
more colloquial notation as =, 6=, <, >, ≤, ≥, ∅, and Q×Q.
17. Four axioms of R not in L4
Table 7 shows the atom structure of a non-commutative proper relation algebra
called 1337 in [28]. It satisfies conditions (p1), (p2), (p4), and (p6) in Definition 4,
plus (p3′) and (p5′), and therefore has all the required properties to be a relevant
model structure except (comm). It is normal since 0∗ = 0. It is therefore called a
“non-commutative normal relevant model structure”.
Although condition (p1) is called “0-reflexivity”, it insures that the proper rela-
tion algebra 1337 is dense, i.e., satisfies x ≤ x2, where x2 = x;x. Condition (p1)
should therefore be called “density”, but the term “square-increasing” is commonly
used instead because it describes the shape of the equation that defines density.
Since K5 satisfies (p1), it validates the formulas that assert density for all relations,
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namely the contraction axiom (12) and the reductio axiom (13). On the other hand,
since it is not commutative, the axioms depending on that assumption are invalid in
K5, namely contraposition (8), permutation (9), suffixing (10), and modus ponens
(11). These formulas are invalidated in many ways, but in rather few ways if the
valuations are restricted so the propositional variables are mapped to singletons
and the formulas are mapped to the empty set. Here is a complete list of such
valuations (calculated with GAP [7]).
• (8) is invalid in K5 because
J((p→ ∼q)→ (q → ∼p)) = ∅
whenever ν is chosen so that one of these three sets of equations holds:
J(p) = {a} J(q) = {b}
J(p) = {b} J(q) = {b∗}
J(p) = {b∗} J(q) = {a}
• (9) is invalid in K5 because
J((p→ (q → r))→ (q → (p→ r))) = ∅
whenever ν is chosen so that one of these two sets of equations holds:
J(p) = {a} J(q) = {b} J(r) = {a}
J(p) = {b∗} J(q) = {a} J(r) = {a}
• (10) is invalid in K5 because
J((p→ q)→ ((q → r)→ (p→ r))) = ∅
whenever ν is chosen so that one of these four sets of equations holds:
J(p) = {0} J(q) = {a} J(r) = {a}
J(p) = {0} J(q) = {b} J(r) = {a}
J(p) = {b} J(q) = {a} J(r) = {a}
J(p) = {b} J(q) = {b} J(r) = {a}
• (11) is invalid in K5 because
J(p→ ((p→ q)→ q)) = ∅
whenever ν is chosen so that one of these two sets of equations holds:
J(p) = {a} J(q) = {a}
J(p) = {b} J(q) = {a}
18. Representing K5 as a proper relation algebra
As with Belnap’s normal relevant model structure, there is a representation of K5
as the atom structure of a proper relation algebra. Again, Q is the set of rational
numbers. Let U be the set of finite sequences of one or more rational numbers,
in which the first is arbitrary and all others are positive. Define a binary relation
B ⊆ U × U as follows.
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Think of each element of U as representating a location, from which it is possible
to either travel some positive distance in “the same direction”, or to “branch off”
and travel some positive distance in “the new direction”. If s is the new point at
which one arrives by moving as described, then the pair 〈r, s〉 is in the relation
B. Finally, B is the transitive closure of the set of all pairs obtained from this
description.
More formally, an ordered pair 〈r, s〉 of sequences r, s ∈ U is in B0 if and only if
r 6= s and either s can be obtained from r by adding a nonnegative rational to the
last entry of r (travel in the same direction by that amount) or appending a positive
rational number to the end of r (travel in the new direction by that amount). Let
B be the transitive closure of B0. Since B is a partial ordering, we will symbolize
it with “<” in these examples:
〈−8〉 < 〈0〉 < 〈1〉 < 〈1, 2, 3〉 < 〈1, 2, 4〉 < 〈1, 2, 4, 5〉 < 〈1, 2, 4, 5, 6〉 < . . .
Let
σ(b∗) = B,
σ(b) = B−1,
σ(a) = U × U \ (B ∪B−1),
σ(0) = {〈x, y〉 : x = y, x, y ∈ U},
and extend σ to all subsets of K = {0, a, b, b∗} by sending each subset to the union
of the images of its elements under σ.
19. Axiomatizing classical relevant logic
In [34, p. 183], Meyer and Routley define a CR* model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, 0〉.
Their definition is the same as that of a normal relevant model structure except
that conditions (p1), (p4), and 0∗ = 0 are replaced by R0ab ↔ a = b, from which
the three conditions can be derived (using the remaining conditions (p2), (p3), (p5),
and (p6)). Hence every CR* model structure is a normal relevant model structure
(but not conversely).
Their language contains connectives →, ∧, ¬, and ∗ [34, p. 184], while ∨ is
recovered by the definition A ∨ B = ¬(¬ ∧ ¬B) [34, d5., p. 187] and ∼ is defined
by ∼A = ¬(A∗) [34, d4., p. 186]. The notions of valuation and interpretation
in Definition 5 are suitably altered by retaining the conditions pertaining to the
connectives → and ∧, adding the conditions I(¬A, c) = T iff I(A, c) = F and
I(A∗, c) = T iff I(A, c∗) = T , and deriving the conditions for ∨, ◦, and ∼ through
their definitions. Their system CR* of classical relevant logic is defined as the set
of formulas valid in all CR* model structures [34, (9), p. 185]. In section III they
“. . . show that the system CR∗, characterized so that its set of
theorems is exactly the CR∗ valid formulas, exactly contains the
system R of relevant implication on the definition of ∼ by d4.” [34,
p. 187]
This means that a formula A, written in the language of the connectives ∧, ∨,→, ◦,
and ∼, is a theorem of R if and only if the same formula, but with the connectives
∨, ◦, and ∼ defined in terms of ∧, →, ¬, and ∗, is valid in all CR∗ model structures.
Their concluding remarks concern axiomatization.
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“In conclusion, it will be noted that we have neglected to axiom-
atize CR∗. The reason isn’t that it’s unaxiomatizable or anything
like that; indeed, we presume that just putting together the axiom-
atization of CR in [33] and of R in [49] or [2] one would have an
axiomatization of CR∗, near enough, reversing d4 by then defining
A∗ as ¬∼A. Frankly, however, we can’t at this point stomach yet
another completeness proof on ground that we have been over so
often before; any readers that have stuck with us through the se-
ries of papers that began with [49] feel as we do, no doubt, letting
the semantic characterization of CR∗ above suffice. But the case
is now pretty strong that ¬ was just left out of Anderson-Belnap
formulations of their logics, and evidence is building that the entire
project of relevant logic is unified and simplified when the semantic
¬, with a different function from the deduction-theoretic — that
has been present from the start, is added. This paper is part of
that evidence.”
Meyer and Routley [33, p. 53] axiomatize the system R+ with axioms A1–A11,
A14, and A15, and rules R1 and R2 from [49, p. 204]. These axioms and rules are
the ones that do not mention negation. To combine these with the axioms and
rules of [49], as they suggest, would seem to do nothing more than restore axioms
A12 and A13 that involve negation. All these axioms and rules are recounted in
[2, pp.340-1]. Since they require defining A∗ as ¬∼A, they may intend that the
axioms involving negation appear twice, once with ∼, and once with ¬. This is also
suggested by Meyer [32]. It would have been interesting if Meyer and Routley had
attempted a more explicit axiomatization, for once the language includes the full
range of connectives ∧, ∨, →, ◦, ∼, ¬, and ∗, either primitively or by definition,
the opportunity exists to axiomatize classical relevant logic with Tarski’s axioms.
We might describe classical relevant logic as the system obtained from Tarski’s ten
axioms R1–R10, suitable renotated using these translations:
A ∨B = A+B,
A ∧B = A · B,
B ◦A = A;B,
A→ B = A−1 ;B,
¬A = A,
∼A = A˘,
A∗ = A−1.
Be that as it may, they (and their readers, perhaps) feel that the semantic char-
acterization of CR* suffices. Certainly that is all we need to observe that L(32) is
not a theorem of CR∗, because it is invalidated in the CR* model structures K1
and K2. Indeed, all five normal relevant model structures K1–K5 used in this paper
satisfy the condition R0ab ↔ a = b, and are therefore CR* model structures.
20. Formulas in L4
The 38 lemmas presented next establish membership in Tarski’s relevance logic
of the formulas in Tables 1 and 2.
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Lemma 1. A ∨∼A
Proof.
1. A00⇒A00 Axiom
2. ⇒A00, (∼A) 00 |∼
3. ⇒ (A ∨ ∼A) 00 |∨

Lemma 2. A→ A
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. ⇒ (A→ A) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 3. A ∧B → A
Proof.
1. A10, B10⇒A10 Axiom)
2. (A ∧B) 10⇒A10 ∧|
3. ⇒ ((A ∧B)→ A) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 4. A ∧B → B
Proof.
1. A10, B10⇒B10 Axiom
2. (A ∧B) 10⇒B10 1, ∧|
3. ⇒ ((A ∧B)→ B) 00 2, |→, no 1

Lemma 5. A→ A ∨B
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10, B10 Axiom
2. A10⇒ (A ∨B) 10 |∨
3. ⇒ (A→ A ∨B) 00 →|, no 1

Lemma 6. B → A ∨B
Proof.
1. B10⇒A10, B10 Axiom
2. B10⇒ (A ∨B) 10 |∨
3. ⇒ (B → A ∨B) 00 →|, no 1

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Lemma 7. B ∨A→ A ∨B
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10, B10 Axiom
2. A10⇒ (A ∨B) 10 |∨
3. B10⇒A10, B10 Axiom
4. B10⇒ (A ∨B) 10 |∨
5. (B ∨ A) 10⇒ (A ∨B) 10 2, 4, ∨|
6. ⇒ (B ∨ A→ A ∨B) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 8. B ∧A→ A ∧B
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. B10⇒B10 Axiom
3. A10, B10⇒ (A ∧B) 10 |∧
4. (B ∧ A) 10⇒ (A ∧B) 10 ∧|
5. ⇒ (B ∧ A→ A ∧B) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 9. (A ∧B) ∧C → A ∧ (B ∧ C)
Proof.
1. A10, B10, C10⇒B10 Axiom
2. A10, B10, C10⇒C10 Axiom
3. A10, B10, C10⇒ (B ∧C) 10 |∧
4. A10, B10, C10⇒A10 Axiom
5. A10, B10, C10⇒ (A ∧ (B ∧ C)) 10 |∧
6. (A ∧B) 10, C10⇒ (A ∧ (B ∧ C)) 10 ∧|
7. ((A ∧B) ∧ C) 10⇒ (A ∧ (B ∧C)) 10 ∧|
8. ⇒ ((A ∧B) ∧ C → A ∧ (B ∧ C)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 10. (A ∨B) ∨ C → A ∨ (B ∨ C)
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10, B10, C10 Axiom
2. B10⇒A10, B10, C10 Axiom
3. (A ∨B) 10⇒A10, B10, C10 |∨
4. C10⇒A10, B10, C10 Axiom
5. ((A ∨B) ∨ C) 10⇒A10, B10, C10 ∨|
6. ((A ∨B) ∨ C) 10⇒A10, (B ∨ C) 10 |∨
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7. ((A ∨B) ∨ C) 10⇒ (A ∨ (B ∨C)) 10 |∨
8. ⇒ ((A ∨B) ∨ C → A ∨ (B ∨ C)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 11. A ∧ (B ∨ C)→ (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C)
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. B10⇒B10 Axiom
3. C10⇒C10 Axiom
4. A10, B10⇒ (A ∧B) 10 1, 2, |∧
5. A10, C10⇒ (A ∧ C) 10 1, 3, |∧
6. A10, (B ∨C) 10⇒ (A ∧B) 10, (A ∧ C) 10 ∨|
7. (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) 10⇒ (A ∧B) 10, (A ∧ C) 10 ∧|
8. (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) 10⇒ ((A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C)) 10 |∨
9. ⇒ ((A ∧ (B ∨ C))→ ((A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 12. (A→ ∼C) ∧ (B → C)→ ∼(A ∧B)
Proof.
1. A01⇒A01 Axiom
2. B01⇒B01 Axiom
3. C00⇒C00 Axiom
4. (∼C) 00, C00⇒ ∼|
5. (A→ ∼C) 10, C00, A01⇒ 1, 4, →|
6. (A→ ∼C) 10, (B → C) 10, A01, B01⇒ 2, 5, →|
7. (A→ ∼C) 10, (B → C) 10, (A ∧B) 01⇒ ∧|
8. (A→ ∼C) 10, (B → C) 10⇒ (∼(A ∧B)) 10 |∼
9. ((A→ ∼C) ∧ (B → C)) 10⇒ (∼(A ∧B)) 10 ∧|
10. ⇒ (((A→ ∼C) ∧ (B → C))→ ∼(A ∧B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 13. (A→ ∼B) ∧ (∼A→ ∼C)→ (∼B ∨∼C)
Proof.
1. A11⇒A11 Axiom
2. ⇒A11, (∼A) 11 |∼
3. C01⇒C01 Axiom
4. (∼C) 10, C01⇒ ∼|
5. (∼A→ ∼C) 10, C01⇒A11 2, 4, →|
6. B01⇒B01 Axiom
7. (∼B) 10, B01⇒ ∼|
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8. (A→ ∼B) 10, (∼A→ ∼C) 10, B01, C01⇒ 5, 7, →|
9. (A→ ∼B) 10, (∼A→ ∼C) 10, B10⇒ (∼C) 10 |∼
10. (A→ ∼B) 10, (∼A→ ∼C) 10⇒ (∼B) 10, (∼C) 10 |∼
11. (A→ ∼B) 10, (∼A→ ∼C) 10⇒ (∼B ∨ ∼C) 10 |∨
12. ((A→ ∼B) ∧ (∼A→ ∼C)) 10⇒ (∼B ∨ ∼C) 10 ∧|
13. ⇒ (((A→ ∼B) ∧ (∼A→ ∼C))→ (∼B ∨ ∼C)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 14. ∼∼A→ A
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. ⇒A10, (∼A) 01 |∼
3. (∼∼A) 10⇒A10 ∼|
4. ⇒ (∼∼A→ A) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 15. A→ ∼∼A
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. A10, (∼A) 01⇒ ∼|
3. A10⇒ (∼∼A) 10 |∼
4. ⇒ (A→ ∼∼A) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 16. ∼(A ∨B)→ (∼A ∧ ∼B)
Proof.
1. A01⇒A01 Axiom
2. ⇒ (∼A) 10, A01 |∼
3. B01⇒B01 Axiom
4. ⇒ (∼B) 10, B01 |∼
5. ⇒ (∼A ∧ ∼B) 10, A01, B01 2, 4, |∧
6. ⇒ (∼A ∧ ∼B) 10, (A ∨B) 01 |∨
7. (∼(A ∨B)) 10⇒ (∼A ∧∼B) 10 ∼|
8. ⇒ (∼(A ∨B)→ (∼A ∧ ∼B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 17. ∼(A ∧B)→ (∼A ∨ ∼B)
Proof.
1. A01⇒A01 Axiom
2. B01⇒B01 Axiom
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3. A01, B01⇒ (A ∧B) 01 |∧
4. A01, B01, (∼(A ∧B)) 10⇒ ∼|
5. A01, (∼(A ∧B)) 10⇒ (∼B) 10 |∼
6. (∼(A ∧B)) 10⇒ (∼A) 10, (∼B) 10 |∼
7. (∼(A ∧B)) 10⇒ (∼A ∨ ∼B) 10 |∨
8. ⇒ (∼(A ∧B)→ (∼A ∨∼B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 18. (∼A ∧ ∼B)→ ∼(A ∨B)
Proof.
1. A01⇒A01 Axiom
2. B01⇒B01 Axiom
3. (A ∨B) 01⇒A01, B01 ∨|
4. (∼B) 10, (A ∨B) 01⇒A01 ∼|
5. (∼A) 10, (∼B) 10, (A ∨B) 01⇒ ∼|
6. (∼A ∧ ∼B) 10, (A ∨B) 01⇒ ∧|
7. (∼A ∧ ∼B) 10⇒ (∼(A ∨B)) 10 |∼
8. ⇒ ((∼A ∧ ∼B)→ ∼(A ∨B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 19. (∼A ∨ ∼B)→ ∼(A ∧B)
Proof.
1. A01⇒A01 Axiom
3. (∼A) 10, A01⇒ ∼|
2. B01⇒B01 Axiom
4. (∼B) 10, B01⇒ ∼|
5. (∼A ∨ ∼B) 10, A01, B01⇒ 2, 4, ∨|
6. (∼A ∨ ∼B) 10, (A ∧B) 01⇒ ∧|
7. (∼A ∨ ∼B) 10⇒ (∼(A ∧B)) 10 |∼
8. ⇒ ((∼A ∨ ∼B)→ ∼(A ∧B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 20. ((A→ A)→ B)→ B
Proof.
1. A01⇒A01 Axiom
2. ⇒ (A→ A) 11 |→, no 0
3. B10⇒B10 Axiom
4. ((A→ A)→ B) 10⇒B10 →|
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5. ⇒ (((A→ A)→ B)→ B) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 21. (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ (B ∧ C))
Proof.
1. A21⇒A21 Axiom
2. B20⇒B20 Axiom
3. (A→ B) 10, A21⇒B20 1, 2, →|
4. C20⇒C20 Axiom
5. (A→ C) 10, A21⇒C20 1, 4, →|
6. (A→ B) 10, (A→ C) 10, A21⇒ (B ∧ C) 20 3, 5, |∧
7. ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)) 10, A21⇒ (B ∧ C) 20 ∧|
8. ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)) 10⇒ (A→ (B ∧ C)) 10 |→, no 2
9. ⇒ (((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C))→ (A→ (B ∧ C))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 22. (A→ C) ∧ (B → C)→ ((A ∨B)→ C)
Proof.
1. A21⇒A21 Axiom
2. C20⇒C20 Axiom
3. (A→ C) 10, A21⇒C20 →|
4. B21⇒B21 Axiom
5. C20⇒C20 Axiom
6. (B → C) 10, B21⇒C20 →|
7. (A→ C) 10, (B → C) 10, (A ∨B) 21⇒C20 3, 6, ∨|
8. ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C)) 10, (A ∨B) 21⇒C20 ∧|
9. ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C)) 10⇒ ((A ∨B)→ C) 10 →|, no 2
10. ⇒ (((A→ C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨B)→ C)) 00 →|, no 1

Lemma 23. (A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∧ C → B ∧D)
Proof.
1. A21, C21⇒C21 Axiom
2. (A ∧ C) 21⇒C21 ∧|
3. B20, D20⇒B20 Axiom
4. B20, D20⇒D20 Axiom
5. B20, D20⇒ (B ∧D) 20 |∧
6. B20, (C → D) 10, (A ∧ C) 21⇒ (B ∧D) 20 2, 5, →|
7. A21, C21⇒A21 Axiom
8. (A ∧ C) 21⇒A21 ∧|
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9. (A→ B) 10, (C → D) 10, (A ∧ C) 21⇒ (B ∧D) 20 6, 8, →|
10. (A→ B) 10, (C → D) 10⇒ (A ∧ C → B ∧D) 10 |→, no 2
11. ((A→ B) ∧ (C → D)) 10⇒ (A ∧C → B ∧D) 10 ∧|
12. ⇒ ((A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∧ C → B ∧D)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 24. (A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∨ C → B ∨D)
Proof.
1. A21⇒A21 Axiom
2. B20⇒B20, D20 Axiom
3. B20⇒ (B ∨D) 20 |∨
4. (A→ B) 10, A21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 1, 3, →|
5. C21⇒C21 Axiom
6. D20⇒B20, D20 Axiom
7. D20⇒ (B ∨D) 20 |∨
8. (C → D) 10, C21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 5, 7, →|
9. (A→ B) 10, (C → D) 10, (A ∨ C) 21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 4, 8, ∨|
10. (A→ B) 10, (C → D) 10⇒ (A ∨ C → B ∨D) 10 |→, no 2
11. ((A→ B) ∧ (C → D)) 10⇒ (A ∨C → B ∨D) 10 ∧|
12. ⇒ ((A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∨ C → B ∨D)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 25. (A→ B) ∨ (C → D)→ ((A ∧ C)→ (B ∨D))
Proof.
1. A21⇒A21 Axiom
2. B20, C21⇒B20, D20 Axiom
3. (A→ B) 10, A21, C21⇒B20, D20 →|
4. (A→ B) 10, A21, C21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 |∨
5. (A→ B) 10, (A ∧ C) 21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 ∧|
6. (A→ B) 10⇒ ((A ∧ C)→ (B ∨D)) 10 no 2
7. C21⇒C21 Axiom
8. D20, A21⇒B20, D20 Axiom
9. (C → D) 10, A21, C21⇒B20, D20 →|
10. (C → D) 10, A21, C21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 |∨
11. (C → D) 10, (A ∧ C) 21⇒ (B ∨D) 20 ∧|
12. (C → D) 10⇒ ((A ∧ C)→ (B ∨D)) 10 no 2
13. ((A→ B) ∨ (C → D)) 10⇒ ((A ∧ C)→ (B ∨D)) 10 6, 12, ∨|
14. ⇒ (((A→ B) ∨ (C → D))→ ((A ∧C)→ (B ∨D))) 00 |→, no 1

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Lemma 26. A→ (∼B → ∼(A→ B))
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. B12⇒B12 Axiom
3. A10, (A→ B) 02⇒B12 →|
4. A10⇒ (∼(A→ B)) 20, B12 |∼
5. A10, (∼B) 21⇒ (∼(A→ B)) 20 ∼|
6. A10⇒ (∼B → ∼(A→ B)) 10 |→, no 2
7. ⇒ (A→ (∼B → ∼(A→ B))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 27. A→ (B → ∼(A→ ∼B))
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. B21⇒B21 Axiom
3. B21, (∼B) 12⇒ ∼|
4. A10, B21, (A→ ∼B) 02⇒ 1, 3, →|
5. A10, B21⇒ (∼(A→ ∼B)) 20 |∼
6. A10⇒ (B → ∼(A→ ∼B)) 10 |→, no 2
7. ⇒ (A→ (B → ∼(A→ ∼B))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 28. A→ ((∼B → ∼A)→ B)
Proof.
1. B20⇒B20 Axiom
2. ⇒B20, (∼B) 02 |∼
3. A10⇒A10 Axiom
4. A10, (∼A) 01⇒ ∼|
5. A10, (∼B → ∼A) 21⇒B20 2, 4, →|
6. A10⇒ ((∼B → ∼A)→ B) 10 |→, no 2
7. ⇒ (A→ ((∼B → ∼A)→ B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 29. A→ ((B → ∼A)→ ∼B)
Proof.
1. A10⇒A10 Axiom
2. A10, (∼A) 01⇒ ∼|
3. B02⇒B02 Axiom
4. A10, (B → ∼A) 21, B02⇒ →|
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5. A10, (B → ∼A) 21⇒ (∼B) 20 |∼
6. A10⇒ ((B → ∼A)→ ∼B) 10 |→, no 2
7. ⇒ (A→ ((B → ∼A)→ ∼B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 30. ∼((A→ B)→ ∼A)→ B
Proof.
1. A12⇒A12 Axiom
2. ⇒A12, (∼A) 21 ∼|
3. B10⇒ (∼A) 21, B10 Axiom
4. (A→ B) 20⇒ (∼A) 21, B10 →|
5. ⇒ ((A→ B)→ ∼A) 01, B10 |→, no 2
6. (∼((A→ B)→ ∼A)) 10⇒B10 |∼
7. ⇒ (∼((A→ B)→ ∼A)→ B) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 31. ∼A→ ((B → A)→ ∼B))
Proof.
1. B02⇒B02 Axiom
2. A01⇒A01 Axiom
3. (B → A) 21, B02⇒A01 →|
4. (∼A) 10, (B → A) 21, B02⇒ ∼|
5. (∼A) 10, (B → A) 21⇒ (∼B) 20 |∼
6. (∼A) 10⇒ ((B → A)→ ∼B) 10 |→, no 2
7. ⇒ (∼A→ ((B → A)→ ∼B)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 32.
(A ◦B) ∧C → ((A ∧ ∼D) ◦B) ∨ (A ◦ (B ∧ (D ◦ C)))
∼(A→ ∼B) ∧C → ∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) ∨ ∼(A→ ∼(B ∧∼(D → ∼C)))
Proof.
1. A20⇒A20 Axiom
2. D02⇒D02 Axiom
3. ⇒ (∼D) 20, D02 |∼
4. A20⇒ (A ∧ ∼D) 20, D02 1, 3, |∧
5. B12⇒B12 Axiom
6. B12, (∼B) 21⇒ ∼|
7. A20, B12, ((A ∧∼D)→ ∼B) 01⇒D02 4, 6, →|
8. C10⇒C10 Axiom
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9. C10, (∼C) 01⇒ ∼|
10. C10, A20, B12, ((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) 01, (D → ∼C) 21⇒ 7, 9, →|
11. C10, A20, B12, ((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) 01⇒ (∼(D → ∼C)) 12 |∼
12. C10, A20, B12, ((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) 01⇒ (B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)) 12 5, 11, |∧
13. C10, A20, B12, ((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) 01, (∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C))) 21⇒ |∼
14. C10, A20, B12, ((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) 01, (A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C))) 01⇒ 1, 13, →|
15. C10, A20, ((A ∧∼D)→ ∼B) 01, (A→ ∼(B ∧∼(D → ∼C))) 01⇒ (∼B) 21 |∼
16. C10, ((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) 01, (A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C))) 01⇒ (A→ ∼B) 01 |→, no 2
17. C10, (A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C))) 01⇒ (A→ ∼B) 01, (∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B)) 10 |∼
18. C10⇒ (A→ ∼B) 01, (∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B)) 10, (∼(A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)))) 10 |∼
19. (∼(A→ ∼B)) 10, C10⇒ (∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B)) 10, (∼(A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)))) 10 ∼|
20. (∼(A→ ∼B) ∧ C) 10⇒ (∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B)) 10, (∼(A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)))) 10 ∧|
21. (∼(A→ ∼B) ∧ C) 10⇒ (∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) ∨ ∼(A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)))) 10 |∨
22. ⇒ (∼(A→ ∼B) ∧ C → ∼((A ∧ ∼D)→ ∼B) ∨ ∼(A→ ∼(B ∧ ∼(D → ∼C)))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 33. (A→ B) ∧ (C ◦D)→ ((C ∧B) ◦D) ∨ (C ◦ (D ∧ ∼A))
(A→ B) ∧∼ (C → ∼D)→ ∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D) ∨ ∼(C → ∼(D ∧∼A))
Proof.
1. A21⇒A21 Axiom
2. B20⇒B20 Axiom
3. (A→ B) 10, A21⇒B20 →|
4. (A→ B) 10⇒ (∼A) 12, B20 |∼
5. C20⇒C20 Axiom
6. (A→ B) 10, C20⇒ (∼A) 12, (C ∧B) 20 |∧
7. D12⇒D12 Axiom
8. (A→ B) 10, C20, D12⇒ (D ∧ ∼A) 12, (C ∧B) 20 |∧
9. (A→ B) 10, C20⇒ (D ∧ ∼A) 12, (C ∧B) 20, (∼D) 21 |∼
10. (A→ B) 10, (∼(D ∧ ∼A)) 21, C20⇒ (C ∧B) 20, (∼D) 21 ∼|
11. (∼D) 21⇒ (∼D) 21 Axiom
12. (A→ B) 10, ((C ∧B)→ ∼D) 01, (∼(D ∧ ∼A)) 21, C20⇒ (∼D) 21 →|
13. C20⇒C20 Axiom
14. (A→ B) 10, ((C ∧B)→ ∼D) 01, (C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A)) 01, C20⇒ (∼D) 21 →|
15. (A→ B) 10, ((C ∧B)→ ∼D) 01, (C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A)) 01⇒ (C → ∼D) 01 |→, no 2
16. (A→ B) 10, (C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A)) 01⇒ (∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D)) 10, (C → ∼D) 01 |∼
17. (A→ B) 10⇒ (∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D)) 10, (∼(C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A))) 10, (C → ∼D) 01 |∼
18. (A→ B) 10, (∼ (C → ∼D)) 10⇒ (∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D)) 10, (∼(C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A))) 10 ∼|
19. ((A→ B) ∧∼ (C → ∼D)) 10⇒ (∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D)) 10, (∼(C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A))) 10 ∧|
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20. ((A→ B) ∧∼ (C → ∼D)) 10⇒ (∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D) ∨ ∼(C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A))) 10 |∨
21. ⇒ ((A→ B) ∧ ∼ (C → ∼D)→ ∼((C ∧B)→ ∼D) ∨ ∼(C → ∼(D ∧ ∼A))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 34. (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B))
Proof.
1. C32⇒C32 Axiom
2. A31⇒A31 Axiom
3. (C → A) 21, C32⇒A31 →|
4. B30⇒B30 Axiom
5. (A→ B) 10, (C → A) 21, C32⇒B30 →|
6. (A→ B) 10, (C → A) 21⇒ (C → B) 20 |→, no 3
7. (A→ B) 10⇒ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) 10 |→, no 2
8. ⇒ ((A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 35. (B → (C → A))→ (∼(B → ∼C)→ A)
Proof.
1. B31⇒B31 Axiom
2. C23⇒C23 Axiom
3. A20⇒A20 Axiom
4. (C → A) 30, C23⇒A20 →|
5. (B → (C → A)) 10, B31, C23⇒A20 1, 4, →|
6. (B → (C → A)) 10, B31⇒A20, (∼C) 32 |∼
7. (B → (C → A)) 10⇒A20, (B → ∼C) 12 |→, no 3
8. (B → (C → A)) 10, (∼(B → ∼C)) 21⇒A20 ∼|
9. (B → (C → A)) 10⇒ ((∼(B → ∼C)→ A)) 10 |→, no 2
10. ⇒ ((B → (C → A))→ (∼(B → ∼C)→ A)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 36. (∼(A→ ∼B)→ C)→ (A→ (B → C))
Proof.
1. B32⇒B32 Axiom
2. A21⇒A21 Axiom
3. B32, (∼B) 23⇒ ∼|
4. A21, B32, (A→ ∼B) 13⇒ →|
5. A21, B32⇒ (∼(A→ ∼B)) 31 |∼
6. C30⇒C30 Axiom
7. (∼(A→ ∼B)→ C) 10, A21, B32⇒C30 →|
8. (∼(A→ ∼B)→ C) 10, A21⇒ (B → C) 20 |→, no 3
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9. (∼(A→ ∼B)→ C) 10⇒ (A→ (B → C)) 10 |→, no 2
10. ⇒ ((∼(A→ ∼B)→ C)→ (A→ (B → C))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 37. (A→ B)→ (∼(A→ C)→ ∼(B → C))
(A→ B)→ ((A ◦D)→ (B ◦D))
Proof.
1. C32⇒C32 Axiom
2. B30⇒B30 Axiom
3. B30, (B → C) 02⇒C32 →|
4. A31⇒A31 Axiom
5. (A→ B) 10, (B → C) 02, A31⇒C32 →|
6. (A→ B) 10, (B → C) 02⇒ (A→ C) 12 |→, no 3
7. (A→ B) 10⇒ (∼(B → C)) 20, (A→ C) 12 |∼
8. (A→ B) 10, (∼(A→ C)) 21⇒ (∼(B → C)) 20 ∼|
9. (A→ B) 10⇒ (∼(A→ C)→ ∼(B → C)) 10 |→, no 2
10. ⇒ ((A→ B)→ (∼(A→ C)→ ∼(B → C))) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 38. (A ◦B) ◦ C → A ◦ (B ◦ C)
Proof.
1. (B → ∼C) 31⇒ (B → ∼C) 31 Axiom
2. ⇒ (∼(B → ∼C)) 13, (B → ∼C) 31 |∼
3. (∼∼(B → ∼C)) 31⇒ (B → ∼C) 31 ∼|
4. A30⇒A30 Axiom
5. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01, A30⇒ (B → ∼C) 31 →|
6. B23⇒B23 Axiom
7. C12⇒C12 Axiom
8. C12, (∼C) 21⇒ ∼|
9. (B → ∼C) 31, B23, C12⇒ 6, 8, →|
10. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01, A30, B23, C12⇒ 5, 9, Cut
11. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01, C12, A30⇒ (∼B) 32 |∼
12. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01, C12⇒ (A→ ∼B) 02 |→, no 3
13. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01, (∼(A→ ∼B)) 20⇒ (∼C) 21 |∼
14. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01⇒ (∼(A→ ∼B)→ ∼C) 01 |→, no 2
15. (A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C)) 01, (∼(∼(A→ ∼B)→ ∼C)) 10⇒ ∼|
16. (∼(∼(A→ ∼B)→ ∼C)) 10⇒ (∼(A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C))) 10 |∼
17. ⇒ (∼(∼(A→ ∼B)→ ∼C)→ ∼(A→ ∼∼(B → ∼C))) 00 |→, no 1
18. ⇒ (∼(A ◦B → ∼C)→ ∼(A→ ∼(B ◦ C))) 00 def ◦
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19. ⇒ ((A ◦B) ◦ C → A ◦ (B ◦ C)) 00 def ◦

21. Deductive rules of L4
The next 13 lemmas establish the derived rules of inference for Tarski’s relevance
listed Table 3.
Lemma 39 (adjunction). If A,B ∈ L4 then A ∧B ∈ L4.
Proof. If A and B have 4-proofs we may concatenate them and add one more
sequent to get a 4-proof of A ∧B, as follows.
1. ⇒A00 by some 4-proof
2. ⇒B00 by some 4-proof
3. ⇒ (A ∧B) 00 |∧

Lemma 40 (modus ponens). If A→ B ∈ L4 and A ∈ L4 then B ∈ L4.
Proof. Assume A and A → B have 4-proofs. Concatenate a 4-proof of A with a
4-proof of A → B and continue the sequence as follows, obtaining a 4-proof of B,
showing B ∈ L4.
1. ⇒ (A→ B) 00 by some 4-proof
2. ⇒A00 by some 4-proof
3. B00⇒B00 Axiom
4. (A→ B) 00⇒B00 →|
5. ⇒B00 1, 4, Cut

Lemma 41 (disjunctive syllogism). If A ∨B ∈ L4 and ∼A ∈ L4 then B ∈ L4.
Proof. If A ∨B and ∼A have 4-proofs, they may be continued to obtain a 4-proof
of B.
1. ⇒ (A ∨B) 00 by a 4-proof
2. ⇒ (∼A) 00 by a 4-proof
3. A00⇒A00 Axiom
4. B00⇒B00 Axiom
5. (A ∨B) 00⇒A00, B00 ∨|
6. ⇒A00, B00 1, 5, Cut
7. (∼A) 00⇒B00 ∼|
8. ⇒B00 2, 7, Cut

Lemma 42 (transitivity). If A→ B ∈ L4 and B → C ∈ L4 then A→ C ∈ L4.
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Proof. Assume A → B ∈ L4 and B → C ∈ L4. Then the sequents ⇒ (A→ B) 00
and ⇒ (B → C) 00 have 4-proofs that can be concatenated with steps 2–5 inserted
between them, followed by sequents 7–12, yielding a 4-proof of A → C, hence
A→ C ∈ L4.
1. ⇒ (A→ B) 00 by a 4-proof
2. A10⇒A10 Axiom
3. B10⇒B10 Axiom
4. (A→ B) 00, A10⇒B10 →|
5. A10⇒B10 1, 4, CUT
6. ⇒ (B → C) 00 by a 4-proof
7. B10⇒B10 Axiom
8. C10⇒C10 Axiom
9. (B → C) 00, B10⇒C10 →|
10. B10⇒C10 6, 9, Cut
11. A10⇒C10 5, 10, Cut
12. ⇒ (A→ C) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 43 (contraposition). If A→ B ∈ L4 then ∼B → ∼A ∈ L4.
Proof. Assume A→ B ∈ L4. By interchanging 0 and 1 throughout any 4-proof of
⇒ (A→ B) 00, we obtain a 4-proof of ⇒ (A→ B) 11, which may be continued as
follows to obtain a 4-proof of ∼B → ∼A.
1. ⇒ (A→ B) 11 by a (01)-permuted 4-proof
2. A01⇒A01 Axiom
3. B01⇒B01 Axiom
4. A01, (A→ B) 11⇒B01 →|
5. A01⇒B01 1, 4, Cut
6. ⇒B01, (∼A) 10 |∼
7. (∼B) 10⇒ (∼A) 10 ∼|
8. ⇒ (∼B → ∼A) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 44 (contraposition.2). If A→ ∼B ∈ L4 then B → ∼A ∈ L4.
Proof. Assume A → ∼B has a 4-proof. Obtain a 4-proof of ⇒ (A→ ∼B) 11 by
interchanging 0 and 1 in a 4-proof of ⇒ (A→ ∼B) 00. Continue this 4-proof as
follows to obtain a 4-proof of B → ∼A.
1. ⇒ (A→ ∼B) 11 by a (01)-permuted 4-proof
2. A01⇒A01 Axiom
3. B10⇒B10 Axiom
4. (∼B) 01, B10⇒ ∼|
5. (A→ ∼B) 11, B10, A01⇒ 2, 4, →|
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6. B10, A01⇒ 1, 5, Cut
7. B10⇒ (∼A) 10 |∼
8. ⇒ (B → ∼A) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 45 (cut). If A ∧B → C ∈ L4 and B → C ∨A ∈ L4 then B → C ∈ L4.
Proof. The Cut Rule in relevance logic is a derived rule in Basic Logic, called
DR2 [50, p. 291]. To prove this simplified version of DR2, construct a 4-proof of
B → C from 4-proofs of A ∧ B → C and B → C ∨ A as follows. It is interesting
that Cut for sequents is used five times.
1. B10⇒B10 Axiom
2. (C ∨ A) 10⇒ (C ∨ A) 10 Axiom
3. (B → C ∨ A) 00, B10⇒ (C ∨ A) 10 →|
4. ⇒ (B → C ∨ A) 00 by a 4-proof
5. B10⇒ (C ∨ A) 10 Cut
6. C10⇒C10 Axiom
7. A10⇒A10 Axiom
8. (C ∨ A) 10⇒C10, A10 ∨|
9. B10⇒C10, A10 5, 8, Cut
10. (A ∧B) 10⇒ (A ∧B) 10 Axiom
11. C10⇒C10 Axiom
12. (A ∧B → C) 00, (A ∧B) 10⇒C10 →|
13. ⇒ (A ∧B → C) 00 by a 4-proof
14. (A ∧B) 10⇒C10 Cut
15. A10⇒A10 Axiom
16. B10⇒B10 Axiom
17. A10, B10⇒ (A ∧B) 10 |∧
18. A10, B10⇒C10 14, 17, Cut
19. B10⇒C10 9, 18, Cut
20. ⇒ (B → C) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 46 (E-rule, BR1, R5). If A ∈ L4 then (A→ B)→ B ∈ L4.
Proof. The E-rule [4, p. 8] is also called BR1 [50, p. 289] and R5 [4, p. 193]. If A
has a 4-proof, then we obtain a 4-proof of (A→ B)→ B by appending sequents to
a 4-proof of ⇒A11, as follows.
1. ⇒A11 by a (01)-permuted 4-proof
2. B10⇒B10 Axiom
3. (A→ B) 10⇒B10 →|
4. ⇒ ((A→ B)→ B) 00 |→, no 1
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
Lemma 47 (suffixing). If A→ B ∈ L4 then (B → C)→ (A→ C) ∈ L4.
Proof. Assume A→ B is 4-provable. Interchange 0 and 1 throughout a 4-proof of
⇒ (A→ B) 00, obtaining a 4-proof of ⇒ (A→ B) 11, and continue it as follows to
obtain a 4-proof of (B → C)→ (A→ C).
1. ⇒ (A→ B) 11 by a (01)-permuted 4-proof
2. A21⇒A21 Axiom
3. B21⇒B21 Axiom
4. (A→ B) 11, A21⇒B21 →|
5. C20⇒C20 Axiom
6. (B → C) 10, B21⇒C20 3, 5, →|
7. A21⇒B21 1, 4, Cut
8. (B → C) 10, A21⇒C20 Cut
9. (B → C) 10⇒ (A→ C) 10 |→, no 2
10. ⇒ ((B → C)→ (A→ C)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 48 (cycling). If A→ (B → C) ∈ L4 then B → (∼C → ∼A) ∈ L4
Proof. IfA→ (B → C) is 4-provable, then there is a 4-proof of ⇒ (A→ (B → C)) 22,
which may be incorporated into a 4-proof of B → (∼C → ∼A) as follows.
1. A02⇒A02 Axiom
2. (B → C) 02⇒ (B → C) 02 Axiom
3. (A→ (B → C)) 22, A02⇒ (B → C) 02 →|
4. ⇒ (A→ (B → C)) 22 by a (02)-permuted 4-proof
5. A02⇒ (B → C) 02 Cut
6. B10⇒B10 Axiom
7. C12⇒C12 Axiom
8. (B → C) 02, B10⇒C12 →|
9. A02, B10⇒C12 5, 8, Cut
10. B10⇒C12, (∼A) 20 |∼
11. B10, (∼C) 21⇒ (∼A) 20 ∼|
12. B10⇒ (∼C → ∼A) 10 |→, no 2
13. ⇒ (B → (∼C → ∼A)) 00 |→, no 1

Lemma 49 (prefixing rule). If A→ B ∈ L4 then (C → A)→ (C → B) ∈ L4.
Proof. By Lemma 34, (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) ∈ L4, so if A→ B ∈ L4
then ((C → A)→ (C → B)) ∈ L4 by Lemma 40. 
Lemma 50 (affixing). If A→ B ∈ L4 and C → D ∈ L4 then
(B → C)→ (A→ D) ∈ L4.
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Proof. By C → D ∈ L4 and Lemma 49,
(A→ C)→ (A→ D) ∈ L4.
by A→ B ∈ L4 and Lemma 47,
(B → C)→ (A→ C) ∈ L4.
Hence, by Lemma 42,
(B → C)→ (A→ D) ∈ L4.

Lemma 51 (monotonic fusion). If A→ B ∈ L4 and C → D ∈ L4 then
(A ◦ C)→ (B ◦D) = ∼(A→ ∼C)→ ∼(B → ∼D) ∈ L4,
Proof.
1. A→ B ∈ L4 Assumption
2. C → D ∈ L4 Assumption
3. ∼D → ∼C ∈ L4 Lemma 44
4. (B → ∼D)→ (A→ ∼D) ∈ L4 1, Lemma 47
5. (A→ ∼D)→ (A→ ∼C) ∈ L4 3, Lemma 49
6. ((B → ∼D)→ (A→ ∼D))→ ((B → ∼D)→ (A→ ∼C)) ∈ L4 Lemma 49
7. (B → ∼D)→ (A→ ∼C) ∈ L4 4, 6, Lemma 40
8. ∼(A→ ∼C)→ ∼(B → ∼D) ∈ L4 Lemma 44
9. (A ◦ C)→ (B ◦D) ∈ L4 definition

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